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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the final judgment rendered 
below pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j) (1953). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Whether the District Court's Findings of Fact numbered 5, 
6, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21 and 26 were clearly erroneous being 
without any evidentiary foundation requiring reversal of the 
judgment and a new trial.1 
B. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that JONES' 
action was not commenced within the time required by Utah Code Ann. 
§78-14-4 (1953), when JONES did not know and had no reason to know 
that he had sustained a legal injury prior to September 15, 1987.2 
C. Whether the District Court erred, by failing to properly 
consider that the "knowledge of injury" prong of the Foil test, 
xThe appellate court will not set aside a trial court's 
findings of facts unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding is 
"clearly erroneous" when the appellate court, after reviewing the 
record, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made. An appellate court will regard a finding as clearly 
erroneous when the finding is unsupported by the evidence*. To 
challenge a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must 
demonstrate the findings are against the clear weight of the 
evidence. 
2A trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law reviewed on appeal de novo. Ward v. Richfield City, 
798 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990). Similarly, the appellate court accords 
the trial court's conclusions of law no particular deference, but 
reviews them for de novo. Bonham v. Morgan, 778 P.2d 497, 499 
(Utah 1989); State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 
(Utah 1990); Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Utah 1980); 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Zions First 
Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 
1988). 
1 
tolled the two year limitations period until JONES knew or should 
have known of the full nature, extent, severity and permanence of 
his injury.2 
D. Whether the District Court erred, as a matter of law, by 
failing to properly apply the "knowledge of negligence" prong of 
the Foil which tolled the two year limitations period until JONES 
knew or has reason to know the cause of his injury and the 
potential negligence of Defendants.2 
E. Whether the District Court erred, in concluding that the 
"continuing treatment doctrine" adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Peteler v. Robinson, 17 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1932) is no longer 
applicable law in light of Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 (1953).2 
F. Whether the District Court erred, in concluding that the 
"continuing treatment doctrine" would not apply to this case, where 
JONES was under continuous treatment by Defendants from 1984 until 
after December, 1987, because JONES knew of the existence of his 
injury and possible.2 
III. APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §§78-14-4, 78-14-8, 78-14-12 (1953), as 
amended. See infra Addendum. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE3 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Thi3 is a medical malpractice action in which 
Plaintiff/Appellant G. Kevin Jones (JONES) seeks damages for 
injuries which include, among other things, permanent sexual 
dysfunction as a result of negligent surgery and care rendered by 
Defendants and their agents. PL. at 2-8, Plaintiff's Complaint. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On December 4, 1987, a Notice of Intent to Commence Action was 
served on Defendants pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§78-14-8 (1953). See Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1; PL. at 3, 
Plaintiff's Complaint 15. On January 15, 1988, a Request for Pre-
litigation Panel Review and a copy of said Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action were filed with the Utah State Department of 
Business Regulation and served on Defendants pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-14-12 (1953). Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 2; PL. at 3, Plaintiff's Complaint 55. A pre-litigation 
hearing was held before the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, Department of Business Regulation. The 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing subsequently 
issued and mailed to the parties its opinion and its affidavit of 
compliance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-14-12 (1953). 
3The record in this action consists of three volumes of 
pleadings (hereinafter PL.), four volumes of trial transcripts 
(hereinafter TR.) and exhibits. References in Plaintiff's Brief 
are noted first to the record or exhibit, and then to the paginated 
page. For example, PL. at , TR. at or Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 
3 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No, 3; PL. at 3, Plaintiff's Complaint 15. 
JONES' Complaint was filed on April 26, 1988. PL. at 2-9. 
The trial was bifurcated to determine whether JONES' claim was 
timely filed pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §78-14-4 (1953). The bifurcated trial was prosecuted to 
the District Court without a jury on November 12, 13 and 15, 1991. 
PL. at 1090. 
The District Court ruled that the claim was barred by the 
statute of limitations because JONES had failed to commence the 
action within two years from the date he knew or reasonably should 
have known that he sustained an injury that was caused by an act of 
Defendants. PL. at 1046, (Court's Decision); PL. at 1085, 
(Findings of Fact); PL. at 1091, (Judgment). 
The District Court, with some changes, approved Defendant's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. PL. at 1064a-1070; PL. at 
1083-1088; PL. at 1093. Judgment was entered on January 23, 1992. 
PL. at 1091. On February 3, 1992, JONES filed a Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment, or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial. PL. at 
1095-1105. JONES' Motion for New Trial was denied on March 6, 
1992. PL. at 1118. JONES thereafter filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal on April 6, 1992. PL. at 1120-1121. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS4 
1. From December 29, 1983 through January, 1987, JONES was 
under the care of Defendant James M. Becker, M.D. ("BECKER"), who 
was an agent and employee of other Defendants named herein 
4For a more detailed statement of facts, see PL. 531-45. 
4 
("HOSPITAL"). PL. at 532; TR. at 1393 lines 7-11, at 1395 lines 
16-20, at 1430 lines 12-13, at 1432 lines 17-19, (testimony of G. 
Kevin Jones); TR. at 1180 lines 14-15, (testimony of Dr. J. 
Becker). 
2. JONES was admitted to University Hospital to undergo the 
Ileal Pouch - Anal Anastomosis, a new, major surgical procedure for 
the treatment of chronic ulcerative colitis. TR. at 1391 lines 6-
8, at 1395 lines 16-25, at 1396 lines 1-25, at 1397 lines 1-5, 
(testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1192 lines 12-25, at 1193 
lines 1-25, at 1194 lines 1-25, at 1195 lines 1-25, at 1209 lines 
13-14, at 1212 lines 1-25, at 1213 lines 1-2, (testimony of Dr. J. 
Becker); Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5. 
3. Within weeks of being released from the University 
Hospital on April 16, 1984, for treatment arising from his second 
surgery on February 27, 1984, JONES began to be aware that he was 
suffering some sexual disability. TR. at 1410 at lines 8-25, at 
1411 lines 1-25, (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). JONES' sexual 
dysfunctions, which still exist today, include: (1) loss of 
ejaculation, (2) diminished quality of erections, and (3) 
interrupted climax. TR. at 1410, lines 19-25; TR. at 1411, lines 
1-25; TR. at 1412, lines 1-10, (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). 
4. During the ongoing physician-patient relationship between 
JONES and Defendants, JONES believed and BECKER testified that he 
was the best qualified physician in the Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
Intermountain areas to care for and treat JONES' inflammatory bowel 
disease. TR. at 1256 lines 2-5, 17-23, at 1259 lines 23-25, at 
5 
1260 lines 1-5, (testimony of Dr. Becker). BECKER was the only 
physician in the Intermountain area performing the ileo-anal 
surgical procedure on adults when JONES was operated on in 1984. 
TR. at 1255a, lines 7-19; TR. at 1256, lines 24-25; TR. at 1257, 
lines 1-2, 14-20; TR. at 1258, lines 1-13; TR. at 1259, lines 23-
25; TR. at 1260, lines 1-18, (testimony of Dr. Becker). 
5. Prior to the surgical procedures, BECKER identified the 
risks of surgery to include pelvic infections and anesthesia 
complications. TR. at 1398 lines 5-21, at 1404 lines 18-25, at 
1405 lines 1-7 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1494 lines 10-
13 (testimony of Marie Jones). BECKER specifically represented to 
JONES that there was no risk of impairment to his sexual function 
and that the surgeries were performed in such a manner that it was 
almost surgically impossible from an anatomical standpoint to 
damage nerves that control JONES' sexual function. TR. at 1399 
lines 3-8, at 1405 lines 4-7 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4; TR. at 1514 lines 14-19, at 1516 lines 
15-17 (testimony of Dr. Garth N. Jones). 
6. Prior to the surgeries, BECKER refused to implement JONES' 
request to store JONES' sperm. Again, BECKER represented to JONES 
there was no need to exercise this precaution because there was no 
risk of injury to his sexual function from the surgeries or care. 
TR. at 1399 lines 14-18, at 1400 lines 19-22, at 1405 lines 10-19 
(testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1497, lines 13-19, 25; TR. at 
1498, lines 1-6; 15-22; TR. at 1501, lines 16-17 (testimony of 
Marie Jones); TR. at 1514 lines 1-13 (testimony of Dr. Garth N. 
6 
Jones). JONES had normal sexual functions before his second 
surgery. TR. at 1402 lines 8-16 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. 
at 1229 lines 15-25, at 1230 lines 1-25, at 1231 lines 1-25, at 
1232 lines 1-13 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1499 lines 19-25, 
at 1500 lines 1-12 (testimony of Marie Jones). 
7. JONES reported his awareness of his sexual dysfunction to 
BECKER in April or May, 1984. TR. at 1410 lines 8-12 (testimony of 
G. Kevin Jones). BECKER repeatedly and consistently informed and 
represented to JONES that his sexual disorders were in no way 
related to the surgeries, that the surgical procedures had been 
properly performed, that no damage to nerves had been sustained, 
and that the surgeries were performed in such a manner that it was 
almost anatomically impossible to damage nerves controlling his 
sexual functions. TR. at 1399 lines 3-8, at 1405 lines 4-7, at 
1414 lines 7-10, 22-25, at 1415 lines 1-10, at 1416 lines 8-13, at 
1417 lines 1-4, at 1445 lines 2-9 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4. HOSPITAL and BECKER further advised 
JONES that his sexual disorders were mental not physical and 
recommended general psychotherapy. TR. at 1322 lines 6-10, at 1417 
lines 5-23, at 1419 lines 16-21, at 1420 lines 1-4, at 1421 lines 
12-15, at 1424 lines 22-24 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 
1261 lines 9-17, at 1262 lines 8-22 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. 
at 1569 lines 1-3, at 1575 lines 9-16, at 1591 lines 7-10 
(testimony of Terri Stoker); TR. at 1677 lines 16-22 (testimony of 
Dr. Segal); TR. at 1310 lines 6-19 (testimony of Dr. Hammond); 
Defendants' Exhibit 6 (Dr. Hammond's findings); TR. at 1661 lines 
7 
6-12 (testimony of Dr. Middleton). 
JONES was also told by Defendants that his sexual disorders 
were temporary, and due to prolonged use of drugs for medical 
treatment, serious illness, trauma of surgery, malnourishment, 
fatigue, infrequent sex, and that in time his sexual functions 
would return. TR. 1322 lines 6-10, at 1323 lines 11-17, at 1333 
lines 7-9, at 1414 lines 11-20, at 1417 lines 13-23, at 1421 lines 
15-18, at 1466 lines 11-13 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 
1207 lines 15-25, at 1208 lines 1-2, at 1249 lines 11-20 (testimony 
of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1657 lines 4-12, at 1662 lines 7-18 
(testimony of Dr. Middleton); TR. at 1165 lines 15-20, at 1172 
lines 17-25 (testimony of Dr. Dayton). 
8. In a telephone conversation initiated by JONES' father, 
Dr. Garth N. Jones, in May, 1984, BECKER represented to Dr. Jones 
that the operations could not have caused any sexual problems for 
JONES. That conversation was communicated by Dr. Jones to JONES. 
TR. at 1516 lines 12-25, at 1517 lines 1-25, at 1518 lines 1-12 
(testimony of Dr. Garth N. Jones). BECKER also assured JONES' 
mother, Marie Jones, that JONES not suffering any sexual 
dysfunctions experienced were not as a result of the surgeries. 
TR. at 1502 lines 13-21 (testimony of Marie Jones). 
9. In addition to sexual dysfunction, since the surgery, 
JONES has consistently suffered from recurrent prostatitis, urinary 
infections, persistent diarrhea, frequent yeast infections and skin 
irritations in the rectum; interrupted sleep, incontinence and 
infections of the anal pouch. PL. at 677-20; TR. at 1632 lines 19-
8 
20, at 1633 lines 1-8 (testimony of Dr. Harman). Moreover, JONES 
was later informed in 1991 that Defendant BECKER'S original 
diagnosis of ulcerative colitis was probably erroneous. Instead, 
JONES suffers from Crohns Disease, a disease that requires entirely 
different surgical treatment than what JONES received from BECKER. 
TR. at 1633 lines 8-15, at 1639 lines 13-24, at 1645 lines 11-25 
(testimony of Dr. Harman); Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5. 
10. It was not until September 15, 1987, that JONES became 
aware for the first time of the true nature of his injuries, the 
cause and the possibility of negligence. TR. at 1447 lines 18-25, 
at 1448 lines 1-25, at 1449 lines 1-25, at 1450 lines 19-25, at 
1451 lines 1-25, at 1452 lines 1-21 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). 
On this date JONES received medical examination and treatment from 
Dr. Merril T. Dayton. At that time Dr. Dayton informed JONES that 
the most likely cause of his sexual dysfunctions was that 
"something went wrong during the surgeries to damage nerves." TR. 
at 1450 lines 12-16. See also TR. at 1449 lines 18-21 (testimony 
of G. Kevin Jones). Prior to Dr. Dayton's statement on September 
15, 1987, JONES had no reason to believe that the surgery performed 
in 1984 may have been improperly done and caused his sexual 
dysfunction. TR. at 1450 lines 24-25, at 1451 lines 1-8 (testimony 
of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1577 lines 13-21 (testimony of Terri 
Stoker). Dr. Dayton is an employee of HOSPITAL and the successor 
surgeon to BECKER. TR. 1130 at lines 13-25, at 1131 lines 1-10, at 
1155 lines 11-19, at 1168 lines 6-15 (testimony of Dr. Dayton); TR. 
at 1401 lines 23-25, at 1402 lines 1-4 (testimony of Dr. Becker). 
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Dr. Dayton was the first physician trained and experienced in the 
ileo-anal procedure, a unique medical specialty in 1984, whom JONES 
had seen, other than Dr. Becker, since undergoing surgery. JONES' 
treatment from Dr. Dayton was the first time JONES consulted with 
a knowledgeable, independent physician about his medical condition. 
TR. at 1398 lines 7-19, at 1399 lines 2-5, 17-25, at 1400 lines 1-
2, 14-20, at 1401 lines 23-25, at 1402 lines 1-4, 23-25, at 1403 
lines 1-5 (testimony of Dr. Becker). 
11. JONES relied upon agents and employees of HOSPITAL during 
the course of his continuing care and treatment with respect to his 
condition. TR. at 1322 lines 6-10, at 1332 lines 11-17, at 1333 
lines 7-9, at 1405 lines 19-21, at 1407 lines 4-25, at 1408 lines 
1-25, at 1409 lines 1-3, at 1445 lines 20-23, at 1469 lines 5-8, at 
1481 lines 7-15 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1519 lines 
18-24 (testimony of Dr. Garth N. Jones); TR. at 1497 lines 15-20, 
at 1498 lines 20-25, at 1499 lines 1-2, at 1501 lines 11-13, at 
1504 lines 1-2, 20-23 (testimony of Marie Jones); TR. at 1564 lines 
20-25, at 1565 line 1, at 1569 lines 11-13 (testimony of Terri 
Stoker). 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions 
begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should know that he has 
sustained an injury, the injury's cause and that the injury is 
attributable to negligence. The District Court erred in ruling 
that mere awareness of a temporary condition constitutes knowledge 
of injury and begins the limitations period. Knowledge of injury 
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sufficient to commence the limitations period occurs only when a 
plaintiff has knowledge of the full nature, extent and permanency 
of his injuries. Mere awareness of a physical condition alone does 
not constitute notice of a legal injury for purposes of statutory 
accrual. Further, knowledge of injury cannot occur when a person 
relies upon physicians representations that the condition is not an 
injury but rather, is routine, temporary or non-existent. Further, 
the District Court's ruling would encourage baseless claims merely 
to stop the statute from running where a plaintiff posses knowledge 
of injury absent knowledge of a causal link between the injury and 
negligence. Permitting the statute to accrue upon the mere 
awareness of a medical condition would also reward health care 
providers who withhold relevant information from a patient until 
the statute has run. Therefore, in cases where the condition is 
represented by the health care providers to be temporary and 
unrelated to medical treatment, the statute must be tolled until 
the plaintiff knows that his condition is not merely temporary. 
The requisite "knowledge of negligence" occurs only when a 
plaintiff knows that he had suffered an "injury," its "cause" and 
that it may have resulted from "negligence." The record reveals no 
evidence which indicates that JONES was ever informed, prior to his 
consultation with Dr. Dayton on September 15, 1987, that his 
described and represented "temporary" dysfunction was permanent, 
caused by the surgery and was the result of negligence. In cases, 
such as this case, where there are multiple potential causes of 
injury, the statute of limitations must be tolled until the 
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plaintiff becomes aware of the actual cause of his injury. 
The continuous treatment doctrine recognized by the Utah 
Supreme Court also tolls the running of the statute of limitations 
until the termination of a course of treatment for the same or 
related illnesses out of which the claim for malpractice arises. 
The District Court held that the doctrine was inconsistent with 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4. However, other states which have similar 
statutory limitations periods based on "discovery" still follow the 
continuous treatment rule, citing Utah as authority. Furthermore, 
the doctrine applies even if the plaintiff is aware of the 
negligence before the continuing period of treatment ends. 
The unique facts of this case justify this Court to apply the 
"exceptional circumstances" rule to toll the statute of limitations 
until September 15, 1987, when JONES first learned of the permanent 
nature of his dysfunction, its cause and possible negligence. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 5, 
6, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21 AND 26 ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
1. FACTS 5, 6, & 10. Findings of Fact numbered 5, 6, and 10 
state that JONES and his parents were fully informed by BECKER 
concerning the risks of the ileo-anal surgical procedure, including 
the risk of sexual dysfunction as a result of the procedure. PL. 
at 1084-85. This factual finding is devoid of any basis in the 
testimony or evidence presented at the trial. In fact, the 
contrary is true. See supra Statement of Fact, 5. The only 
significant evidence presented indicates that BECKER specifically 
12 
rejected JONES' request to store his sperm in the event of problems 
which might result from the surgery. Id. BECKER further 
represented that sexual dysfunction was not one of the risks of the 
procedure. Statement of Fact, 5. 
Moreover, the bifurcation of issues and trial was to address 
the issue of what point in time JONES knew or should have known 
that his sexual dysfunction was caused by the surgery and likely 
resulted from negligence. The issue of informed consent is 
irrelevant to a proper resolution of the statute of limitations 
issue. Accordingly, the Court's findings were clearly erroneous 
and contrary to the overwhelming, contrary evidence, thus mandating 
reversal and a new trial. 
2. FACT 16. Finding of Fact number 16 states that beginning 
in May, 1984, JONES knew that his second surgery on February 27, 
1984, was a possible cause of his sexual dysfunctions and that he 
might have a cause of action against Defendants. PL. at 1085. 
This finding is also contrary to the only evidence offered on this 
point. See supra Statement of Facts, 7, 8, 10, and 11. JONES 
specifically denied any knowledge that his dysfunction was caused 
by the operation of February 1984. At best JONES testified that he 
reported the existence of dysfunction to BECKER in April or May of 
1984. He reported the dysfunction, not because he believed it was 
caused by the surgery or negligence, but because he had a medical 
problem and sought medical attention from his treating physician. 
Further, his inquiry as to whether it was possible that the surgery 
had caused his dysfunction was met with BECKER'S suggestion that 
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not only was it causally impossible but that there were a multitude 
of other causes for his problem. He was also told that the 
dysfunction was probably temporary and to let time pass, and 
concentrate on recovery from his other health problems before 
worrying about his sexual abilities. 
3. FACT 17. Finding of Fact numbered 17 states that JONES did 
not rely upon Defendants' opinion that his sexual dysfunctions were 
caused by psychological factors. PL. at 1085. This finding is 
clearly erroneous. See JONES' Statement of Facts numbered 7 and 
11. To the contrary the only evidence presented to the Court was 
that JONES followed the advise of BECKER and sought additional 
treatment based on BECKER'S representation that the dysfunction was 
psychological and temporary. 
4. FACTS 18 & 19. Findings of Fact numbered 18 and 19 state 
that JONES was never misled in any manner concerning the possible 
causes of his sexual dysfunction and that the Defendants did not 
conceal any information relevant to JONES' condition. PL. at 1086. 
However, even a brief review of the record indicates incontestably 
that BECKER entirely discounted any possibility of a causal 
relationship between the surgery and his dysfunction. He was told 
that his dysfunction was psychologicalf temporary, caused by his 
general health at the time, and was more perceived than real. See 
supra Statement of Facts, 5, 7, 8 and 10. There is no evidence in 
the record which tends to show JONES was told or informed that the 
surgery could cause or did cause permanent, serious sexual 
dysfunction. Defendants repeatedly denied any causation between 
14 
the surgery and the dysfunction, telling JONES the cause was to be 
found elsewhere. Absent any basis in the record, the finding is 
clearly erroneous and the Court's decision must be reversed. 
5. FACT 20. Findings of Fact numbered 20 states that during 
the years 1984 and 1985 JONES considered suing Defendants for 
medical malpractice. PL. at 1086. This finding is also clearly 
erroneous and has no basis in the record. The only testimony 
introduced showed JONES rigorously denied that he contemplated 
suing the University before his September 15, 1987 consultation 
with Dr. Dayton. TR. at 1319 lines 3-5, at 1320 lines 5-7 
(testimony of G. Kevin Jones). The record demonstrates that during 
that particular time, JONES' disappointment was directed not at the 
cause or blame for his dysfunction but at "the way in which [he] 
was treated as an individual and as a patient" by Defendants. TR. 
at 1314a lines 20-23 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1634 
lines 10-19, at 1642 lines 8-15 (testimony of Dr. Harman) . 
Feelings of anxiety and disappointment do not replace the knowledge 
of legal injury required to commence the statutory period under 
Utah law. The Court's finding was contrary to the overwhelming 
evidence in the record and must be reversed for a new trial. 
6. FACT 26. Findings of Fact numbered 26 states that JONES' 
action was not timely commenced within two years after JONES knew 
of his sexual dysfunctions, and that he might have a claim for 
malpractice. PL. at 1086-87. This conclusion of law is clearly 
erroneous. As will be shown below, there is no evidence in the 
record that JONES knew or had reason to know he sustained a legal 
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injury as a result of the surgery performed until September 15, 
1987. See supra Statement of Facts, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11. The 
Court's findings to the contrary as without any factual or 
evidentiary basis and must be reversed. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND 
APPLICATION OF THE "KNOWLEDGE OF INJURY" AND "KNOWLEDGE 
OF NEGLIGENCE" PRONGS OF THE FOIL TEST FOR "LEGAL INJURY" 
In Utah, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
suits requires an action be brought "within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered, the injury. . . . " Utah Code 
Annotated, S 78-14-4. In Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 
1979), the Utah Supreme Court explained that the statutory period 
begins to run "when an injured person knows or should know that he 
has suffered a legal injury." The Court interpreted the, "injury" 
in Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 to mean "legal injury". Id. 
Under Foil, and its progeny, "legal injury" is deemed to be 
known when the plaintiff is aware of facts that would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that "he has an sustained an injury 
and that the injury was caused by negligent action." Foil, 601 P.2d 
at 148; See Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 99 (Utah 1982); Hove v. 
McMaster, 621 P.2d 694, 696-97 (Utah 1980). Facts which give rise 
to the requisite knowledge include; (1) the existence of an injury, 
(2) awareness of its cause and (3) the possibility of negligence. 
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D. Utah 1984); Exnicious 
v. United States, 563 F.2d 418, 420 (10th Cir. 1977); C£. Foil, 601 
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P.2d at 146, 
The record below clearly sets forth that JONES did not have 
any significant information which would have caused him to 
recognize his condition was a legal injury until at least September 
15, 1987. The detailed medical explanation made by Dr. Dayton to 
JONES at this time provided JONES with the first knowledge that he 
was actually injured. It also provided the first indication that 
the cause of his injury may have been the surgery and that 
negligence during the operation was possible. 
Despite this overwhelming evidence of lack of knowledge and 
the absence of contrary evidence, the District Court found that the 
statute of limitations had run because JONES "knew or should have 
known that he had sustained an injury and the causation of the 
same, on or about May of 1984." PL. at 1046 (Court's Decision). 
As the following will show, the District Court erred in improperly 
determining that JONES was aware that he suffered a legal injury 
prior to September 15, 1987. Plaintiff will show that the district 
court erred by improperly applying the requirements of Foil to this 
case. Specifically, the court erred by failing to consider the 
undisputed facts showing that JONES did not know he was injured 
within the meaning of Foil, that JONES had no knowledge that his 
injury was caused by the surgery and that JONES had no reason to 
believe that the injury was the result of medical negligence before 
September 15, 1987. 
1. The District Court erred. in failing to consider that 
knowledge of injury prong of the Foil test includes 
knowledge of the full nature, extent, severity and 
permanence of the injury. 
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The first query in this case concerns the extent of JONES' 
knowledge that he sustained an injury. It must be determined 
whether JONES had possession of facts necessary to satisfy the 
"knowledge of injury" prong of the Foil test. In Foil, the Utah 
Supreme Court reasoned that "knowledge of injury" required a 
plaintiff's understanding of the full nature, extent, severity and 
permanency of his condition. Foil, 601 P.2d at 147. The Court 
stated: 
In the health care field it is typically 
the case that there often is a great disparity 
in the knowledge of those who provide health 
care services and those who receive the 
services with respect to expected and 
unexpected side effects of a given procedure, 
as well as the nature, degree, and extent of 
expected after effects. While the recipient 
may be aware of a disability or dysfunction, 
there may be, to the untutored understanding 
of the average layman, no apparent connection 
between the treatment provided by a physician 
and the injury suffered. Even if there is, it 
may be passed off as an unavoidable side 
effect or a side effect that will pass with 
time. 
Foil, 601 P.2d at 147 (emphasis added); See also Christiansen v. 
Rees, 436 P.2d 435 (Utah 1968). 
The Court recognized patients are not in a position to know 
whether their condition is normal or an injury. The Court 
continued, "Indeed, common experience teaches that one often 
suffers from pain and other physical difficulties without knowing 
or suspecting the true cause, and may, as often happens, ascribe a 
totally erroneous cause to the manifestations." Foil, 601 P.2d at 
147. Therefore, mere awareness of a condition or dysfunction in 
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isolation does not constitute knowledge that the person has 
sustained an injury requisite to commence the limitations period. 
In fact, knowledge of an injury, even permanent, severe injury, 
cannot alone constitute "legal injury " in Utah. As the Court in 
Foil stated, "We hold that the term discovery of 'injury' in §78-
14-4 means discovery of injury and the negligence which resulted in 
the injury" Id. at 148 (emphasis added). 
Subsequent Appellate Court decisions, including this matter, 
courts have ignored the Supreme Court's instruction and have held 
that the requisite "knowledge" the plaintiff must have to satisfy 
the Foil test is mere awareness of a temporary disorder, Reiser, 
641 P.2d at 100; Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital, 663 F. Supp. 781, 
785 (D. Utah 1987); or the mere belief that a patient's symptoms 
were unavoidable side effects of treatment, Flovd v. Western 
Surgical Assoc, Inc., 773 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). These 
cases, including the case at bar, have misapplied the Foil 
"knowledge of injury" test, undercutting the public policies 
announced in Foil. Foil, 601 P.2d at 147-48; See Reiser, 641 P.2d 
at 102-03 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Duerden, 663 F. Supp. at 785 
n.6; Mauahan v. S.W. Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1386-87 (10th 
Cir. 1985). 
Ruling that the first prong of the Foil test is satisfied by 
mere awareness of present physical symptomology or dysfunction 
absent some indication of causation and negligence would "encourage 
persons who experience minor or temporary injuries, dysfunctions, 
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or ailments to file lawsuits to prevent the statute of limitations 
from running on the chance that the full extent of the ailment has 
not been discovered." Duerden, 663 F. Supp. at 785 n.6. Such a 
rule "is not consistent with the unarguably sound proposition that 
unfounded claims should be strongly discouraged." Foil, 601 P.2d 
at 148. As noted in Foil, "One of the chief purposes of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act was to prevent the filing of 
unjustified lawsuits against health care providers, with all the 
attendant costs, economic and otherwise, that such suits entail." 
Foil, 601 P.2d at 148. See also Mauahan, 758 F.2d at 1386. 
Moreover, a plaintiff who merely files suit to prevent the statute 
of limitations from running on the chance that the full extent of 
the dysfunction would later be discovered would be susceptible to 
dismissal on grounds of frivolity, Maughan, 758 F.2d at 1387, or 
merely a symbolic judgment such as an award of nominal damages.5 
Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Calif. 1975). 
In addition, to hold that the first prong of Foil is satisfied 
prior to the time a plaintiff becomes aware of the full extent and 
5
 Nominal damages are awarded to "vindicate a legal right" 
where no actual loss has occurred. Dobbs, Remedies, §3.8 at 191 
(1973); Duerden, 663 F. Supp. at 784 n.4. Nominal damages cannot 
be recovered in a negligence action because actual loss or damage 
is an essential element for a cause of action in negligence. 
Prosser, Torts, §30 at p. 143 (1971); Gaziia v. Nicholas Jems Co., 
543 P.2d 338, 341 (Wash. 1975). The mere threat of future harm, 
not yet realized, will not support a negligence action. Prosser, 
§30 at p. 143; Bridgford v. United States, 550 F.2d 978, 982 (4th 
Cir. 1977). Thus, a right to recover nominal damages will not 
commence the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case, 
only the infliction of actual and appreciable damage will trigger 
the running of the statute of limitations. See Gaziia, 543 P.2d at 
341; Davies, 535 P.2d at 1168; Bridgford, 550 F.2d at 982. 
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permanent nature of his injuries would encourage health care 
providers having relevant information to delay disclosure until 
after the statute has run. Duerden, 663 F. Supp. at 785 n.6; 
Mauqhan, 758 F.2d at 1386; Christiansen, 436 P.2d at 436. The 
District Court's decision in this case invites this type of delay 
by ruling "that Dr. Becker did not acknowledge in 1984 or now that 
JONES has a permanent sexual dysfunction problem caused by surgery, 
is immaterial to the issue of JONES' knowledge." PL. at 1052 
(Court's Decision). Such a ruling is inconsistent with Foil: 
[i]t would also be imprudent to adopt a rule 
that might tempt some health care providers to 
fail to advise patients of mistakes that have 
been made and even to make efforts to suppress 
knowledge of such mistakes in the hope that 
the running of the statute of limitations 
would make a valid cause of action 
nonactionable. . . . The law should foster a 
fulfillment of the duty to disclose so that 
proper remedial measures can be taken and 
damage ameliorated. 
Foil, 601 P.2d at 148. These strong policy reasons militate in 
favor of construing the first prong of the Foil test to require 
knowledge of the injury for which recovery is sought, as well as 
full appreciation of the nature, and extent of the injury. 
This conclusion is supported by federal cases as well as the 
Christiansen decision, which held that knowledge of alleged injury 
requires the injury to manifest itself and be permanent. In 
Christiansen. the issue was whether the plaintiff could maintain an 
action for injuries suffered due to alleged negligence in leaving 
a broken surgical needle in the plaintiff some ten years after the 
operation. The plaintiff successfully argued that the statute did 
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not accrue until the plaintiff discovered the existence of the 
foreign object. The Utah Supreme Court held that when a patient is 
ignorant of his right of action, it did not accrue on the date of 
the alleged negligence, but rather at the date he learned of the 
foreign object in his body. The Court explained "[i]t seems 
somewhat incongruous that an injured person must commence a 
malpractice action prior to the time he knew, or reasonably should 
have known, of his injury and right of action". 436 P.2d at 436 
(emphasis added); See also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill, 
120 n.7, 123-24 (1979); Williams v. Borden, 637 F.2d 731, 735 (10th 
Cir. 1980); Wilson v. United States, 594 F. Supp. 843, 849 (M.D. 
Ala. 1984); Rispoli v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (E.D. 
N.Y. 1983). 
Furthermore, knowledge of an injury is negated where 
physicians make specific representations to the plaintiff that he 
has no injury or that his condition is only temporary. It is a 
recognized rule that "[p]atients may reasonably rely upon 
assurances by physicians that complications are normal and do not 
indicate that an actual injury has occurred." Rosales v. United 
States, 824 F.2d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 1987); See McDonald v. United 
States, 843 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1988); Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250. 
A patient has a "right to place trust and confidence in his 
physician." Otto v. National Institute of Health, 815 F.2d 985, 
988 (4th Cir. 1987); See Massev v. Litton, 669 P.2d 248, 252 (Nev. 
1983). The patient is "utterly dependent upon the skills and 
ability of the physician, the patient should not be required to 
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second-guess his physician's prognosis." McDonald. 843 F.2d at 
249. As the Court noted in Foil, " [i]n the health care field it is 
typically the case that there often is a great disparity in the 
knowledge of those who provide health care services and those who 
receive the services." Foil, 601 P.2d at 147. Moreover, a rule 
requiring patients to scrutinize their doctors diagnosis or 
prognosis would impose an unfair burden on the patient. McDonald, 
843 F.2d at 249. A patient's blameless ignorance of the existence 
or cause of his injury should not be held against him and, 
therefore, prevents the statute of limitations from running until 
the plaintiff receives a correct diagnosis. Urie v. Thompson, 337 
U.S. 163 (1949); Christiansen, 436 P.2d at 436. See also Nicolazzo 
v. United States, 786 F.2d 454, 456 (1st Cir. 1986); Barrett v. 
United States, 689 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1982); Jastremski v. 
United States, 737 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1984). 
The extent of JONES' knowledge of his injury (rather than a 
general awareness of his condition) and medical advice which 
suggests no casual connection or otherwise lays to rest any 
suspicion regarding potential causes of his injury is highly 
relevant and critical to the determination of when a plaintiff 
should be charged with notice of an injury. Lee v. United States, 
485 F. Supp. 883, 886 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Brower v. Brown. 744 P.2d 
1337, 1339 (Utah 1987); DuBose v. Kansas City Southern Railway, 729 
F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1984); Wehrman v. United States. 830 F.2d 1480, 
1484 (8th Cir. 1987); Toal v. United States, 438 F.2d 222, 225 (2d 
Cir. 1971); Bridqford, 550 F.2d at 982. When a physician informs 
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a patient that he has not sustained an injury; that no harm had in 
fact occurred; that complications are temporary or not unusual 
occurrences and will improve with time; the patient cannot be 
charged with knowledge of injury and the statute of limitations is 
not activated. See Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250; Rosales, 824 F.2d at 
804; Kegel v. Runnels, 793 F.2d 924, 927 (8th Cir. 1986); Vacura v. 
Plott, 666 F.2d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 1981); Burgess v. United 
States, 744 F.2d 771, 772, 774 n.7 (11th Cir. 1984); Otto, 815 F.2d 
at 989; Rispoli, 576 F. Supp. at 1402-03; Toal, 438 F.2d at 225; 
Cleveland v. Wong, 701 P.2d 1301, 1306 (Kan. 1985); Massev, 669 
P.2d at 249. Massey is instructive on the knowledge of injury test 
because in deciding what "injury" means in Nevada's statutory 
discovery rule for malpractice, the court relied extensively upon 
Foil. See Massev, 669 P.2d at 251. 
In this case JONES does not dispute that within weeks of being 
released from the University Hospital on April 16, 1984, for 
treatment arising from his second surgery on February 27, 1984, he 
began to experience sexual disability. However, the District Court 
erred in ruling that mere awareness of his condition is all that is 
necessary to trigger the limitations period. JONES, argues that 
although he was generally aware of a medical problem, he lacked any 
appreciable knowledge of the nature and extent of his injuries. 
JONES also held the belief, based on specific representations of 
Defendants that the dysfunction was temporary in nature, did not 
result from the surgery; was probably caused by other factors or 
was non-existent. JONES' total lack of medical knowledge and his 
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justified reliance on Defendants' representations of his condition 
couple to show the Plaintiff had no "knowledge of injury" 
sufficient to satisfy the Foil test. 
In the instant case, JONES did not know the full nature, 
extent, severity, and permanency of his injuries until he was 
advised of these facts by Dr. Merril Dayton on September 15, 1987. 
Previous to this consultation, Defendants never indicated to JONES 
that his sexual dysfunctions were related to their care or were 
permanent. Although following his release from the University 
Hospital on April 16, 1984, JONES had expressed concerns about his 
sexual functions, he was given reasonable and credible explanations 
for the complications that ensued. The record discloses repeated 
visits to University Hospital physicians where JONES was 
continually assured that: (1) no injury was present; and (2) that 
his sexual dysfunctions were temporary and due to non-surgical 
causes. 
BECKER characterized JONES' sexual dysfunction as "ill-
defined". TR. at 1189 lines 9-10. See also PL. at 1085 (Findings 
of Fact 115). He was not sure if JONES had a sexual dysfunction 
problem at all. TR. at 1189 lines 14-23, at 1228 line 25, at 1229 
lines 1-3, at 1235 lines 23-25, at 1236 lines 1-3. Dr. Becker 
stated "that the objective evaluation that [JONES'] had has been 
equivocal in terms of clarifying what it is, or whether it exists." 
TR. at 1189 line 25, at 1190 lines 1-2. (emphasis added). See 
also PL. at 1048 (Court's Decision). 
Dr. Middleton, who JONES was referred to by BECKER "to sort 
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out" the sexual dysfunction question, TR. at 1234 lines 14-15 
(testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1649 lines 10-11, at 1651 lines 
15-22 (testimony of Dr. Middleton); explained to JONES "that it 
would be unlikely that [he] would have a permanent disruption of 
sexual function on the basis of the operations that had been done." 
TR. at 1657 lines 1-2. See also TR. at 1659 lines 17-20 (testimony 
of Dr. Middleton) . Upon inquiry, JONES was told that it was not 
unusual for his sexual function to be disrupted by "surgery 
temporarily." TR. at 1657 lines 9-11 (testimony of Dr. Middleton). 
If there was disruption of some of the sympathetic nerve 
fibers that control ejaculation, JONES was informed that "it was 
very likely not going to be a permanent or severe one, and that it 
will improve with time." TR. at 1661 lines 2-5 (testimony of Dr. 
Middleton); See also TR. at 1660 lines 14-16 (testimony of Dr. 
Middleton); TR. at 1236 lines 13-25, at 1237 lines 1-13 (testimony 
of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1322 lines 6-10, at 1332 lines 10-17, at 
1333 lines 7-9, at 1445 lines 8-9 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). 
Terri Stoker, employed by the University Hospital as a patient 
advocate for BECKER'S post-surgical recovery team, confirmed that 
BECKER informed JONES that if his sexual dysfunctions were related 
to the surgery, the problem would resolve itself with time. TR. at 
1569 lines 4-10; TR. at 1575 lines 10-16; See also TR. at 1604 
lines 16-19 (testimony of Dr. Mangelson). 
BECKER had explained to JONES that two previous male patients 
who had undergone the same surgeries as JONES, subsequently 
experienced retrograde ejaculation complications, a sexual 
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dysfunction where the sperm is ejaculated into the bladder rather 
than out the penis, but this condition corrected itself over time. 
TR. at 1655 lines 10-15 (testimony of Dr. Middleton); TR. at 1414 
lines 5-7, at 1421 lines 19-22f at 1445 lines 10-11, at 1465 lines 
17-22 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1236 lines 19-25, at 
1237 lines 1-13 (testimony of Dr. Becker). Dr. Middleton explained 
to JONES that if the sympathetic nerve fibers that control 
ejaculation are disrupted the "sympathetic nerve fibers regenerate 
and little ultimate harm is done." TR. at 1652 lines 23-25, at 
1653 line 1; See TR. at 1237 lines 18-25, at 1238 lines 1-6 
(testimony of Dr. Becker). 
Dr. Middleton opined JONES' prospects for future recovery were 
good and that he should be patient and "that in time [JONES'] 
ejaculation would return." TR. at 1657 lines 11-12, at 1654 lines 
8-9; See also TR. at 1658, lines 16-17; TR. at 1660 lines 3-4; TR. 
at 1662 lines 7-9. Dr. Middleton did not think that solving JONES' 
sexual dysfunction problems were a "big priority" because restoring 
"his fundamental health and well-being were much more important 
than his ability to ejaculate." TR. at 1658 lines 18-22, at 1663 
lines 16-20. He recommended postponing further evaluation until a 
later time when JONES was healthier. TR. at 1662 lines 14-16. 
JONES had faith in and relied upon the explanations provided 
by University Hospital physicians that no injury was present, that 
his sexual dysfunction problems were temporary, and that his sexual 
function would return with time. See supra Statement of Facts, 11. 
The advice and assurances provided to JONES by University 
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Hospital physicians was confirmed by physicians practicing outside 
of the University Hospital. Dr. Clifford G. Harman, JONES' 
gastroenterologist, counseled JONES to "table the impotence 
question" until JONES' health improved because it was not high on 
the list of health priorities. TR. at 1631 lines 18-22. Dr. 
Mangelson, like Dr. Middleton, is a urologist treating JONES but in 
private practice. He concurred with Dr. Middleton's conclusion 
that given time there would be a recovery of JONES' sexual 
function. TR. at 1599 lines 22-25, at 1600 lines 1-2, at 1602 
lines 14-17, at 1603 lines 6-25, at 1604 lines 1-2, at 1607 lines 
4-6. JONES consistently received hope and encouragement from his 
treating physicians that with time there would be a recovery of his 
sexual functions. See TR. at 1602 lines 7-17, at 1603 lines 5-25, 
at 1604 lines 1-2, at 1607 lines 4-9 (testimony of Dr. Mangelson); 
TR. at 1657 lines 11-18, at 1658 lines 11-17, at 1660 lines 3-4, 
13-16 (testimony of Dr. Middleton); TR. at 1239 line 7 (testimony 
of Dr. Becker). 
Since a patient may properly rely on the advice and 
representations of his treating physicians that an actual injury 
has not occurred and that complications, if any, are not related to 
surgery or are otherwise temporary, JONES had no reason to believe 
at that time that he had sustained any injury. See McDonald, 843 
F.2d at 248; Raddatz, 750 F.2d at 796; Rosales, 824 F.2d at 804. 
In this case, based on the evidence in the record, it is only 
possible to conclude that it was not until after JONES' 
consultation with Dr. Dayton on September 15, 1987, that JONES 
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could have possibly developed knowledge that an injury had 
occurred. Where a patient has been told that complications ctre not 
permanent and "is told further that they can be treated, he cannot 
be deemed to have knowledge of an injury. In such circumstances, 
he can only be deemed to have knowledge after a sufficient period 
of time has passed so as to alert him that the treatmemt is 
unsuccessful." Rispoli, 576 F. Supp. at 1403. In this case it is 
unnecessary to determine what constitutes a sufficient period of 
time since it is entirely reasonable for JONES to have filed his 
Notice within three months of his contact with Dr. Dayton, when 
JONES first became aware of the nature of injuries. Therefore, 
JONES' claim was timely because the assurances given to JONES by 
his treating physicians precluded knowledge of injury prior to 
September of 1987.6 
interestingly and quite ironically, the District Court found 
as a matter of fact that JONES had suffered no injury as a result 
of the surgery. In its decision, the court wrote: " [I]n the 
instant case there still appears to be a real fact question about 
the nature and existence of any sexual dysfunctions and the csLUse." 
PL. at 1048 (Court's Decision) (emphasis added). The District 
Court also characterized JONES' sexual dysfunctions as "ill 
defined", PL. at 1085 (Findings of Fact 115), and "perceived". PL. 
at 1085 (Findings of Fact 517), at 1086 (Findings of Fact * 1 18, 
19, 20 and 26). It is interesting that neither the Court nor 
Defendants doctors to this day agree on whether JONES has suffered 
an injury. To hold JONES to be aware that he has suffered an 
injury, and then find as a matter of fact, that he has not is 
plainly inconsistent and evidences the lower court's confusion 
regarding proper application of Foil. This matter must be reversed 
to permit trial under the proper legal guidelines. 
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2. The District Court erred, as a matter of law, in failing 
to properly apply the knowledge of negligence prong of 
the Foil test. 
The second prong of the Foil legal injury test requires 
"knowledge of negligence". Foil, 681 P.2d at 148. In Foil, the 
Court held that the two year limitation period begins to run when 
the plaintiff "knew or should have known that he had [l]sustained 
an injury and [2] that the injury was [i] caused by [ii] negligent 
action." Foil, 601 P.2d at 148 (emphasis added). The second prong 
of the Foil legal injury test includes two separate knowledge 
elements; cause and negligence. A plaintiff must have knowledge of 
both the cause of the injury and negligent action to satisfy the 
second prong. 
To satisfy the causation element, a plaintiff must know 
that he has been injured and "who has inflicted the injury." 
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. Ill, 122 (1979); Christiansen, 
436 P.2d at 436; Foil 601 P.2d at 146-47. The negligence element 
requires that a plaintiff know that the injury was the result of 
improper treatment. Foil, 601 P.2d at 148; Hove, 621 P.2d at 696; 
Brower, 744 P.2d at 1338-39. In this case the cause and negligence 
elements were satisfied for the first time only after JONES' 
consultation with Dr. Dayton on September 15, 1987. 
The first question, then, is whether JONES knew the cause of 
his injuries before he received medical treatment from Dr. Dayton 
on September 15, 1987. The difficulty in determining the cause of 
JONES' injuries is amply demonstrated in the record. The record 
discloses repeated visits to BECKER and University Hospital 
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physicians who specifically represented that the surgeries were not 
the cause of his sexual disorders. TR. at 1235 lines 4-15, at 1238 
lines 12-14 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1653 lines 20-25, at 
1654 lines 1-17, at 1657 lines 1-3, at 1659 lines 17-20 (testimony 
of Dr. Middleton); TR. at 1414 lines 5-25, at 1415 lines 1-10, at 
1416 lines 8-13, 23-25, at 1417 lines 1-4, at 1421 lines 12-18 
(testimony of G. Kevin Jones); Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 4. BECKER 
also assured JONES' parents that there was "no sexual problems as 
a consequence of this operation." TR. at 1518 line 11-12. See 
also TR. at 1517 lines 20-23 (testimony of Dr. Garth N. Jones); TR. 
at 1502 lines 16-21 (testimony of Marie Jones). 
BECKER and HOSPITAL physicians explained to JONES that one of 
the great benefits of the surgical procedure was that it was 
performed in such a manner that there was no real risk to the 
disruption of a patient's sexual functions. TR. at 1398 line 25, 
at 1399 lines 1-6, at 1414 lines 22-25, at 1415 lines 1-5, at 1416 
lines 8-13, 23-25, at 1417 lines 1-4 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); 
TR. at 1653 lines 12-19 (testimony of Dr. Middleton). BECKER told 
JONES that "it was anatomically almost impossible to disrupt this 
system that would interfere with sexual functions." TR. at 1399 
lines 6-8 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1196 lines 19-25, 
at 1197 lines 1-2 (testimony of Dr. Becker) . In a letter to Dr. 
Middleton, BECKER records a consultation with JONES about his 
sexual functions as follows: 
I spent a great deal of time talking about this problem 
with him in my office this morning. I explained that no 
true cases of impotence had been reported with the 
mucosal proctectomy and ileoanal pull-through procedure. 
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In fact, the operation is performed anatomically such 
that it is almost impossible to damage the 
parasympathetic nerves to the penis or to totally destroy 
the sympathetic innervation. I explained that we had had 
one case of retrograde ejaculation that resolved 
spontaneously. (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4; See also TR. at 1604 lines 5-15 (testimony 
of Dr. Mangelson). 
BECKER was so confident that the surgeries didn't cause JONES' 
sexual problems that he didn't even think JONES had a sexual 
dysfunction at all. TR. at 1189 lines 21-25, at 1190 lines 1-2 
(testimony of Dr. Becker). In an article provided to JONES by 
BECKER in 1987 entitled Ileal Pouch-Anal Anastomosis, BECKER 
describes his surgical experience with a large series of patients 
at the University of Utah Medical Center. TR. at 1457 lines 3-25, 
at 1458 lines 1-14 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 5. The aim of the study was to assess the operative 
outcome, including sexual function, in 100 consecutive patients who 
underwent ileal pouch-anal anastomosis. JONES was included in this 
study as patient no. 33. TR. at 1187 line 14 (testimony of Dr. 
Becker); TR. at 1458 lines 6-7 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). The 
study records the only sexual disorders in males as retrograde 
ejaculation in two male patients with no impotence observed. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 at 378, 383. JONES was not identified as one 
of the male patients suffering retrograde ejaculation. TR. at 1414 
lines 5-7, at 1419 lines 12-14, at 1421 lines 19-22, at 1445 lines 
10-11 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). Thus, as of the date of this 
article, October, 1986, BECKER had not even identified JONES as one 
of his patients suffering from sexual disorders as a result of his 
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surgeries. TR. at 1458 lines 3-14 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). 
BECKER and HOSPITAL physicians explained to JONES that his 
sexual problems were due to a variety of factors that were not 
associated with the surgeries or their care. TR. at 1414 lines 7-
10, at 1421 lines 12-18 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). They even 
told JONES that his sexual problems were mental not physical and 
recommended general psychotherapy. See supra Statement of Facts, 
7. Outside evaluations also concluded that JONES' sexual problems 
were psychological. TR. at 1685 lines 5-6 (testimony of Dr. 
Jaspen); and TR. at 1539 lines 8-14 (testimony of Dr. Smith). 
Other possible causes of JONES' sexual disorders were identified by 
University physicians as prolonged use of medications, serious 
illness, trauma of major surgery, malnourishment, infrequent sexual 
activity, lack of a sex partner, and fatigue. See supra JONES' 
Statement of Facts No. 7. 
The record demonstrates that BECKER really didn't know whether 
JONES' sexual dysfunctions were "in any way related to the 
surgery." TR. at 1235 lines 14-16; See also TR. at 1189 lines 14-
20; TR. at 1228 line 25; TR. at 1229 lines 1-3 (testimony of Dr. 
Becker) . When asked his opinion as to what was the cause of JONES' 
sexual dysfunction, BECKER replied: "I'm not sure. Based on all 
the tests and what has happened . . . and the number of people who 
have seen [JONES] and consulted on the problem, I think it's still 
very unclear." TR. at 1235 lines 23-25, at 1236 lines 1-3. Even 
the District Court found that "in the instant case there still 
appears to be a real fact question about the nature and existence 
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of any sexual dysfunctions and the cause." PL. at 1048 (Court's 
Decision) (emphasis added). See also PL. at 1085 (Findings of Fact 
H 15)("Since April or May, 1984, plaintiff has had an ill defined 
sexual dysfunction, the cause of which has not been definitively 
determined.")(emphasis added). 
It was unreasonable for the District Court to hold JONES to a 
higher degree of medical competence and understanding of the cause 
of his condition than the many medical experts he consulted. See 
Reis v. Cox, 660 P.2d 46, 50 (Idaho 1982); Harrison v. United 
States, 708 F.2d 1023, 1028 (1983). "Ordinarily, a plaintiff 
cannot be expected to discover the general medical cause of his 
injury even before the doctors themselves are able to do so." 
Rosales, 824 F.2d at 805; Chamness v. United States, 835 F.2d 1350, 
1353 (11th Cir. 1988). As stated in Foil: 
Indeed, common experience teaches that one 
often suffers pain and other physical 
difficulties without knowing or suspecting the 
true cause, and may, as often happens, ascribe 
a totally erroneous cause to the 
manifestations. Even those who are trained in 
medical science often require the additional 
expertise of one possessing specialty training 
to diagnose properly the cause of certain 
ailments. 
Foil, 601 P.2d at 147. 
The fact that JONES had suspicions about the cause of his 
injuries are not enough to have the statute run in favor of the 
Defendants. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 345 (D. Utah 
1984) (w[a] finding of reasonable suspicion on the part of the 
plaintiff was insufficient to initiate the running of the statutory 
period. Actual knowledge of facts material to his federal cause of 
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action was required."); Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600, 604 (10th 
Cir. 1983). Similarly, a "layman's subjective belief" regardless 
of its sincerity or ultimate vindication, "in a cause does not 
start the statute when a competent medical professional would 
disagree with the belief." Nemmers v. United States, 795 F.2d 628, 
631 (7th Cir. 1986); Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1269 
(7th Cir. 1980); Gould v. United States, 684 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. 
111. 1988). Plaintiffs who seek to understand the cause of an 
injury may reasonably rely upon advice and assurances by doctors. 
Brower, 744 P.2d at 1339; Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250; Chamness. 835 
F.2d at 1353; McDonald, 843 F.2d at 248. In this case JONES 
believed he was competently advised that the surgery did not cause 
his injuries and therefore should not be punished for refusing to 
press a claim that was apparently baseless at that time. Nemmers, 
795 F.2d at 632. 
The best medical advice available prior to September 15, 1987 
did not establish the cause of JONES' condition. JONES' suspicion 
or belief that his problems dated from the second surgery on 
February 27, 1984, was merely one of series of explanations that he 
seized upon in anguish and desperation to explain his difficulties. 
JONES was influenced by Defendants' conclusion that his problems 
were psychological, TR. at 1469 lines 5-8, at 1481 lines 7-15 
(testimony of G. Kevin Jones), and was willing to see a 
psychiatrist to determine the cause. TR. at 1564 lines 20-25, at 
1565 line 1 (testimony of Terri Stoker); TR. at 1633 line 19 
(testimony of Dr. Harman). During this time, JONES unsuccessfully 
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searched for the cause of his problems. TR. at 1577 lines 13-21 
(testimony of Terri Stoker); TR. at 1634 lines 19-21 (testimony of 
Dr. Harman). None of JONES' privately conceived notions regarding 
the possible cause of his condition became knowledge until 
September 15, 1987 when he was examined by Dr. Dayton. TR. at 1450 
lines 19-25, at 1451 lines 1-21 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). Dr. 
Dayton diagnosed the most likely cause of JONES' sexual 
dysfunctions as disruption to nerves during surgery. TR. at 1449 
lines 18-21, at 1450 lines 12-16 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). 
Dr. Dayton's explanation provided JONES with the first real 
indication of the cause of his disabilities. TR. at 1450 lines 19-
25, at 1451 lines 1-5 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). Only then did 
JONES know that his difficulties were caused by the surgical 
procedures. See Harrison, 708 F.2d at 1028. 
To adopt a rule, such as the District Court did in the instant 
case, that encourages the filing of lawsuits when a plaintiff 
develops a disorder but has no knowledge of its cause, or which of 
several possible causes it may be, is inconsistent with the policy 
that discourages baseless claims, and would needlessly add to an 
already crowded docket. Foil, 601 P.2d at 148; Mauahan, 758 F.2d 
at 1386. Moreover, to adopt a rule that the statute begins to run 
as soon as the plaintiff becomes aware that a number of different 
sources are suspected to be the cause of his difficulties would be 
absurd. It would force a plaintiff to file suit against all 
suspected causes simply to prevent the statute from running as to 
any of them. A plaintiff who did so would be subject to dismissal 
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Dear Clerk, 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellant G. Kevin Jones, hereby notifies the Clerk of 
the Utah Court of Appeals of pertinent and significant 
supplemental authority that has come to the attention of 
Appellant since the Briefs herein were filed. This authority was 
discovered while counsel was preparing for oral argument in this 
matter currently set for March 22, 1993. 
The supplemental authority of Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 
P.2d 817, 819, n.l. (Utah App. 1988), recognizes the continued 
application of the "Continuing Treatment Doctrine" to toll the 
statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases until medical 
treatment with the negligent physician ends. Chadwick recognizes 
the continued validity of the doctrine after passage of U.C.A. 
§78-14-4 (1953), as amended, which became effective July 1, 1976. 
The references to Chadwick should be added to the 
Appellant's Brief and Reply Brief as follows: 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
1. At page two (2), insert, "and cited by the Utah Court 
of Appeals in Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 819, 
n.l (Utah App. 1988).", after the citation "Peteler 
v.Robinson, 17 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1932)." 
2. At page forty-five (45), insert, "and cited by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 
819, n.l (Utah App. 1988).", after the citation 
"Peteler v.Robinson, 17 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1932)." 
3. At page forty-six (46)insert, "Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 
819, n.l." after the statement, "Thus, these cases 
reflect the continued recognition of the continuing 
treatment doctrine in Utah jurisprudence,". 
4. At page forty-nine (49) insert, "Chadwick,763 P«2d at 
819, n.l.", after the citation "Metzger, 709 P.2d at 
417." 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
1. At page one (1) insert "and cited by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Chadwick v. Nielsen/ 763 P.2d 817, 819, n.l 
(Utah App. 1988).", after the citation "Peteler 
v.Robinson, 17 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1932)." 
2. At page thirteen (13) insert, "Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 
819, n.l." after the statement, "Absent evidence of 
intent to abrogate the precedent of Peteler, the 
enactment of section 78-14-4 should be read as being 
consistent." 
3. At page eighteen (18) insert, "Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 
819, n.l.", after the statement "Based on these sound 
principles, this Court should recognize the continuing 
treatment doctrine as a valuable and viable exception 
to section 78-14-4." 
4. At page thirteen (21) insert, "Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 
819, n.l.", after the statement, "Accordingly, this 
Court should uphold the continuing treatment doctrine 
as a consistent exception to section 78-14-4." 
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on grounds of frivolity. See Maughan, 758 F.2d at 1387. 
In cases involving suspected multiple causes such as this one, 
the statute must be tolled until the plaintiff knows the particular 
factor that was "the" cause of the injury. The legal injury test 
requires knowledge of "the" cause of the injury, not "a" cause as 
determined by the District Court. PL. at 1085 (Findings of Fact 
116). To know the cause a plaintiff must know "who has inflicted 
the injury." Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122; Christiansen, 436 P.2d at 
436; See Foil, 601 P.2d at 146-47; Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 155 
(patient must know the existence of an injury and "its" cause); 
Maughan, 758 F.2d at 1385-87 ; Exnicious, 563 F.2d at 420 n.7 ("[A] 
person may be quite aware of damages but may be unable to learn the 
cause of his condition and hence, whether it is related to earlier 
medical treatment"). 
The list of suspected causes of JONES7 sexual dysfunction was 
seemingly endless. There were many suspected causes of the 
difficulties, none of which gave rise to a legal cause of ciction. 
In addition, although JONES attempted to determine the cause of his 
difficulties, he was confronted with complex, controversial, and 
rapidly changing medical data and opinions. Lacking the expert 
knowledge necessary to affix causation, JONES relied upon the 
Defendants' assurance that JONES had not been injured by the 
surgeries. See supra Statement of Facts, 11. Under these 
circumstances, JONES was unable to determine the cause of his 
injuries until after his consultation with Dr. Dayton in September 
of 1987. See supra Statement of Facts, 10. 
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The second question in examining the knowledge of negligence 
prong is whether JONES was aware, along with the knowledge of 
causation, that the injury may have been caused by negligence. In 
Foil, as in the instant case, the plaintiff believed that he 
suffered a physical injury and suspected that the injury may have 
been related to medical treatment. However, in neither Foil nor 
this case was there an obvious reason to suppose that the injury 
was attributable to negligence. In this case the District Court 
incompletely found that JONES' cause of action against the 
Defendants had run because the "plaintiff discovered the 'injury' 
and made the casual connection between the problem and the surgery 
in April or May of 1984." PL. at 1047 (Court's Decision). Why 
JONES should have known at that time that his injuries were 
possibly the result of negligence is simply not explained by the 
District Court nor is it explicable from the record. Moreover, the 
burden of proof was on the Defendant to show JONES knew or had 
reason to know that negligence may have occurred during the 
operation. TR. at 1128 lines 14-19 (statement of the Court). 
The record discloses repeated visits to BECKER and HOSPITAL 
physicians who consistently told JONES that there was nothing wrong 
with the surgeries. TR. at 1415 lines 6-7, at 1417 lines 5-23, at 
1421 lines 12-17, at 1445 lines 6-8 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones); 
TR. at 1228 lines 10-12, at 1235 lines 4-10 (testimony of Dr. 
Becker); TR. at 1653 lines 20-25, at 1654 lines 1-3 (testimony of 
Dr. Middleton). BECKER stated that there were no complications in 
any of the three surgical procedures he performed on JONES in 1984. 
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TR. at 1214 lines 22-25, at 1215 lines 1-21, at 1220 lines 11-17, 
at 1227 lines 20-25, at 1228 lines 7-12 (testimony of Dr. Becker). 
BECKER described the second surgical procedure of February 27, 
1984, the procedure that JONES and Dr. Dayton suspect may have been 
the cause of his injuries, as going "very smoothly." See also 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4 ("The surgery went without difficulty"). 
TR. at 1220 lines 11-15 (testimony of Dr. Becker). BECKER 
experienced "no problems" during this procedure. TR. at 1220 lines 
15-17 (testimony of Dr. Becker). JONES had no abnormal anatomy or 
nerve distribution. TR. at 1215 lines 13-15 (testimony of Dr. 
Becker); See also TR. at 1415 lines 6-8 (testimony of G. Kevin 
Jones)• 
BECKER and HOSPITAL physicians explained to JONES that "the 
operation is performed anatomically such that it is almost 
impossible to damage the parasympathetic nerves to the penis or to 
totally destroy the sympathetic innervation." Plaintiff's Exhibit 
No. 4.(emphasis added); See also TR. at 1196 lines 13-25, at 1197 
lines 1-2 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1653 lines 12-25, at 
1654 lines 1-2, 16-17 (testimony of Dr. Middleton); TR. at 1399 
lines 3-8, at 1415 lines 1-25, at 1416 lines 8-13, 23-25, at 1417 
lines 1-4, at 1445 lines 3-6 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). 
According to BECKER the procedures are performed in such a manner 
that the nerves which control sexual function are not vulnerable at 
any stage of the process. TR. at 1196 lines 13-17, at 1197 lines 
15-17 (testimony of Dr. Becker). BECKER never said anything to 
JONES from which JONES could have implied that BECKER was negligent 
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in performing the surgery. TR. at 1235 lines 4-10, at 1238 lines 
12-15 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1590 lines 15-21 (testimony 
of Terri Stoker). JONES eventually was referred to other doctors 
about his condition,, none of whom ever suggested that the cause of 
his sexual dysfunction was attributable to the negligent surgery or 
care provided by Defendants. All of the other doctors told JONES 
that the surgery was properly performed. TR. at 1594 lines 14-21 
(testimony of Dr. Mcingelson); TR. at 1639 line 25, at 1640 lines 1-
2 (testimony of Dr. Harman). 
It is undisputed that shortly after discovering his symptoms, 
JONES investigated their potential cause and received a credible 
explanation negating injury, causation and negligence. Where a 
claimant is provided with a credible explanation of his problems 
not indicating malpractice, he may not be found to have failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence because he did not earlier pursue his 
claim. Brgwer, 744 P.2d at 1339; Peteler, 17 P.2d at 250; Jordan 
v. United States, 503 F.2d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 1974); Exnicious, 563 
F.2d at 421; Foil, 601 P.2d at 148 n.3; Bridqford, 550 F.2d at 981-
82. As the Seventh Circuit observed in Nemmers, "the statute of 
limitations should not be construed to compel everyone who knows of 
an injury to scour his medical records just in case the . . . 
physician did something wrong." Nemmers. 795 F.2d at 631. 
The record reveals no evidence which indicates that JONES ever 
witnessed anything prior to his consultation with Dr. Dayton on 
September 15, 1987, which should have led him to believe he was the 
victim of malpractice. TR. at 1450 lines 24-25, at 1451 lines 1-8 
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(testimony of G. Kevin Jones); See also TR. at 1577 lines 13-21 
(testimony of Terri Stoker). At this consultation Dr. Dayton told 
JONES that the most likely was that "something went wrong during 
the surgeries" to damage nerves. TR. at 1450 lines 12-16; see also 
TR. at 1449 lines 18-21 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). Prior to 
Dr. Dayton's statement on September 15, 1987, there is nothing in 
the record which would give JONES any reason to believe that the 
act performed during the February 27, 1984 surgery, which probably 
caused his impaired sexual function, may have been improperly done 
and whether or not it conformed to accepted medical practice. TR. 
at 1450 lines 24-25, at 1451 lines 1-8, 12-21 (testimony of G. 
Kevin Jones). It was only after the September 15, 1987 
consultation with Dr. Dayton that Plaintiff first believed that his 
sexual problems may have been caused by medical malpractice and 
that he may have a cause of action against Defendants. See also TR. 
at 1577, lines 1-8, 12-21. See also TR. 1577 lines 13-21 
(testimony of Terri Stoker). 
The myriad medical experts JONES consulted could not express 
a reasoned opinion that the cause of JONES' sexual impairment was 
probably an error in the medical procedures conducted at the 
University Hospital. JONES cannot be attributed with sufficient 
knowledge as a result of the medical evaluations and opinions to 
satisfy the knowledge of negligence prong of Foil prior to 
September 15, 1987. Reis, 660 P.2d at 50; Harrison, 708 F.2d at 
1026, 1028. It is only when JONES had gleaned sufficient 
information which reasonably indicated that something in the 
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performance of or related to the medical treatment that caused the 
injury was improper that the knowledge of negligence test is 
satisfied, Cf. Foil, 601 P.2d at 148; Hove, 621 P.2d at 696; 
Harqett, 598 F. Supp. at 154; grower, 744 P.2d at 1338-39; See also 
Jones v. Salem Hospital, 762 P.2d 303, 313 (Or. App. 1988); Niblack 
v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D. Colo. 1977); Exnicious, 
563 F.2d at 420 n«6; Jordan, 503 F.2d at 621. (During an eye 
examination, plaintiff was told "by the examining doctor that such 
visits were no longer necessary as there was nothing more they 
could do for the eye, and that it was 'too bad they screwed up your 
eye when they operated on your nose.'"). 
Simple awareness of an injury that might have been an 
unavoidable consequence of the medical treatment, or the result of 
some other cause, or even a temporary side effect of treatment does 
not mean that the patient had knowledge that the injury was the 
result of improper treatment. Foil, 601 P.2d at 147; Reiser, 641 
P.2d at 103 (Stewart, J., dissenting); See also Exnicious, 563 
F.2d at 419 n.6 (a patient "may be aware of his injury and perhaps 
connect it with prior medical treatment but may be totally ignorant 
as to what occurred during his treatment and whether or not it 
conformed to accepted medical practice."); Bridgford, 550 F.2d 982; 
Rispoli, 576 F. Supp. at 1402; Cleveland, 701 P.2d at 1306. (While 
the plaintiff knew that he was impotent immediately after surgery 
he had no reason to suspect that the condition was the result of 
any negligence by defendant). Similarly, the discovery of injury 
does not necessarily lead to the discovery of possible negligence. 
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Imes v. Touma, 784 F.2d 756, 758 (6th Cir. 1986). A patient does 
not have a cause of action against a physician simply because a 
surgical procedure "does 'not turn out as it was supposed to 
have.'" DeWitt v. United States, 593 F.2d at 276, 280 (7th Cir. 
1979). 
Numerous cases stress that in a plaintiff's effort to 
understand whether an injury was the result of malpractice, he may 
reasonably rely upon advice and assurances by doctors that no 
negligence is present, grower, 744 P.2d at 1339; Peteler, 17 P.2d 
at 250; Chairiness, 835 F.2d at 1353; McDonald, 843 F.2d at 248; 
Massey, 669 P.2d at 252; Toal, 438 F.2d at 225; Raddatz, 750 F.2d 
at 793, 796; Short v. Downs. 537 P.2d 754, 757 (Colo. App. 1975). 
JONES and his parents did in fact rely upon Defendants' statements 
that nothing went wrong in the surgeries. See supra Statement of 
Facts, 11. 
In this case, at best, the District Court found that JONES 
discovered only a "cause" of his injuries. PL. at 1046 (Court's 
Decision). It did not find or conclude that JONES knew or should 
have known that the cause of his injuries may have been due to 
negligence by Defendants. PL. at 1047 (Court's Decision). The 
District Court's decision erroneously interpreted Foil to mean that 
the statute runs from two years when a plaintiff knew or should 
have known that he had suffered an injury which may hav€» been 
caused by Defendants. However, Foil requires that the plaintiff 
know or should have known that his injuries may have been "caused" 
by "negligence" of the defendant. 601 P.2d at 148; See also Hove, 
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621 P.2d at 696; Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 154; Brower, 744 P.2d at 
1338-39. 
The District Court's error in interpreting and applying the 
knowledge of negligence prong of the Foil test is further 
demonstrated from the court's own statement that it thought the 
trial dealt with "liability", TR. at 1436 lines 22-23, when the 
issue before the court was the statute of limitations. TR. at 1436 
lines 17-21, 24-25 (statement of Mr. Orton); TR. at 1437 lines 1-2 
(statement of Mr. Williams). A court that is unaware of the issue 
being tried before it cannot apply the proper legal standard. 
In the instant case, the District Court erred in its 
interpretation and application of the knowledge of negligence prong 
by barring JONES' claim prior to the time when he had any 
reasonable cause to believe that the acts which caused his injury 
were wrongful. See Jordan, 503 F.2d at 624. As this Court stated 
in Foil, "when injuries are suffered that have been caused by an 
unknown act of negligence by an expert, the law ought not to be 
construed to destroy a right of action before a person even becomes 
aware of the existcmce of that right." 601 P.2d at 147. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN 
CONCLUDING THAT THE CONTINUING TREATMENT DOCTRINE IS NOT 
APPLICABLE SINCE THE LEGISLATURE PASSED S78-14-4, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED. 
In the instant case the District Court held "the continuing 
treatment doctrine" was inconsistent with the Utah statute of 
limitations for medical malpractice as codified in §78-14-4 and 
rejected its application in this case. PL. at 1052 (Court's 
Decision); PL. at 1088 (Conclusions of Law 56-7). The continuing 
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treatment doctrine was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Peteler 
v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 553, 17 P.2d 244, 250 (Utah 1932). The 
doctrine tolls the running of the statute of limitations until the 
termination of the course of treatment for the same or related 
illnesses* Peteler. 17 P.2d at 250. 
The District Court did not explain the rationale for its 
rejection of this precedent. Since the Peteler decision in 1932, 
Utah has consistently been recognized as a state adopting the view 
that the limitation period does not begin to run until termination 
of treatment. See 144 A.L.R. at 227-28 (1943); 80 A.L.R.2d at 380-
81 (1961); Ballenqer v. Crowell, 247 S.E.2d 287, 294 (N.C. 1978) 
(citing Peteler); Comstock v. Collier, 737 P.2d 845, 849 n.6 (Colo. 
1987)(citing Peteler). Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has cited 
Peteler in a decision that post dates the enactment of §78-14-4. 
In Hooper Water Improvement, the Utah Supreme Court discussed 
Utah's statutes of limitations and stated that in Peteler it 
"recognized an exception in medical malpractice cases, which 
exception is very similar to the 'continuous services exception' 
urged by the plaintiff in this action." 642 P.2d at 747 (Howe, J., 
concurring); See e.g. Hooper Water Improvement v. Reeve, 642 P.2d 
745, 747 (Utah 1982)(Howe, J., concurring); Chapman v. Primary 
Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989)(citing 
Peteler). Moreover, in Foil the Court cited Hundley v. St. Francis 
Hospital, 327 P.2d 131, 135 (Cal. 1958) in support of its 
interpretation of §78-14-4. See Foil, 601 P.2d at 148. In Hundley 
the California Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations 
45 
in medical malpractice cases does not commence to run while the 
physician-patient relationship continues. Hundley, 327 P.2d at 
135. Thusf these cases reflect the continued recognition of the 
continuing treatment doctrine in Utah jurisprudence. Finally, 
other states which have discovery type limitations periods similar 
to Utah recognize the continuous treatment rule. See Mills v. 
Garlow. 768 P.2d 554, 555 (Wyo. 1989); Metzaer v. Kalke. 709 P.2d 
414, 416-17 (Wyo. 1985). 
D. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN 
REJECTING THE CONTINUING TREATMENT DOCTRINE TO TOLL THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNTIL JONES/ TREATMENT BY THE 
DEFENDANT WAS CONCLUDED. 
Courts which have addressed the issue uniformly hold that when 
there has been a course of continuous medical treatment the running 
of the statute of limitations against medical malpractice actions 
starts at the end of the treatment if the treatment has been for 
the same or related injury or complaint out of which the claims for 
malpractice arose. See, 144 A.L.R. 209, 227 (1943); 80 A.L.R.2d 
368, 379 (1961); Borgia v. City of New York, 187 N.E.2d 777 (N.Y. 
1962); Farley v. Goode, 252 S.E.2d 594 (Va. 1979); Johnson v. 
Winthrop Laboratories Division of Sterling Drug, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 
77 (Minn. 1971); Williams v. Elias, 1 N.W.2d 121 (Neb. 1941); 
Metzqer, 709 P.2d at 414, 416-17; Otto, 815 F.2d at 985; Comment, 
The Continuous Treatment Doctrine: A Toll on the Statute of 
Limitations for Medical Malpractice in New York, 49 Albany L. Rev. 
64 (1984) (hereinafter Comment); Stallings v. Gunter, 394 S.E.2d 
212 (N.C. App. 1990). 
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Treatment consists not only of treating the original 
condition, but also all subsequent care and treatment essential to 
full recovery. Offerdahl v. University of Minnesota Hospitals & 
Clinics, 411 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Minn. App. 1987). The subsequent 
treatment may consist of an "affirmative act or an omission" which 
is related to the original cause of action. Stallinqs, 394 S.E.2d 
at 216, Comment, at p. 76-77. Subsequent treatment can even occur 
when the physician takes no affirmative action during a patient's 
office visit or when the patient initiates the office visit "to 
complain about and seek treatment for a matter related to the 
initial treatment." McDermott v. Torre, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 
(N.Y. 1982); Comment, at p. 79. This treatment by omission may 
occur "[i]f a patient continues under post-operative observation by 
his physician and is advised that his condition is being cured." 
Fonda v. Paulsen, 363 N.Y.S.2nd, 841, 844 (N.Y. 1975). Under these 
conditions "this is as much 'treatment' as affirmative acts such as 
surgery, therapy, or prescription of medicines. . . [because] there 
would be little chance for legal redress by a patient who has been 
the victim of an alleged malpractice who is advised that time is 
the only barrier to a complete cure, when in reality time is a 
barrier to a cause of action." Fonda, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 844. Thus, 
telephone consultations are evidence that the physician is 
attending and treating the patient. Grondahl v. Bullock, 318 
N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1982); Giles v. Sanford Memorial Hospital & 
Nursing Home, 371 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Minn. App. 1985). 
It is not necessary under the continuous treatment doctrine 
47 
that the subsequent treatment itself be negligent. Holdridge v. 
Heyer - Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1098 
(N.D.N.Y. 1977); Stallinas, 394 S.E.2d at 215; Comment at 77 n.51. 
The rule of decision in continuing treatment cases is that if the 
patient was treated for the same or related ailments over a 
continuous course, then the plaintiff could wait until the end of 
that treatment to complain of any negligence which occurred during 
that treatment. Grubbs v. Rawls, 369 S.E. 2d 683, 687 (Va. 1988). 
Thus, under the continuing treatment doctrine, a plaintiff's cause 
of action does not accrue until the continuing treatment ends, 
"even if the plaintiff is aware of the facts constituting 
negligence before that time." Wehrman, 830 F.2d at 1483; LaBav v. 
White Plains Hospital, 467 N.Y.S.2d 400, 401 (1983); Kelly v. 
United States, 554 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (E.D.N.Y. 2983). Finally, 
courts have declined to limit the application of the continuing 
treatment doctrine to a specific number of years. Justice v. 
Natvia, 381 S.E.2d 8, 10 (Va. 1989)(patient saw defendant 
physicians over an eight year period). 
The record establishes that JONES' attending physician, Dr. 
Becker, continued to treat JONES for the same medical condition 
from 1984 until he left his position at the University Hospital in 
January, 1987, and referred him to Dr. Dayton. TR. at 1430 lines 
12-20, at 1432 lines 13-21, at 1446 lines 20-24 (testimony of G. 
Kevin Jones); TR. at 1180 lines 10-15, 20-25, at 1181 line 1, at 
1258 lines 23-25, at 1259 lines 1-4 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. 
at 1167 lines 20-25, at 1168 lines 1-7 (testimony of Dr. Dayton). 
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On December 5, 1986, Dr. Becker ordered a pelvic CT scan of JONES 
to evaluate him for abscesses, and also discussed with JONES the 
results of the CT scan. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 17; TR. at 1260 
line 25, at 1261 lines 1-6 (testimony of Dr. Becker); TR. at 1430 
lines 21-25, at 1431 lines 1-25; at 1432 lines 1-22; at 1444 lines 
18-24 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). Moreover, the Defendants 
stipulated that their medical treatment of JONES related to the 
operations and extended until Dr. Becker left the University 
Hospital in January, 1987. TR. at 1440 lines 23-25, at 1441 line 
1 (statement of Mr. Williams). See also TR. at 1410 lines 3-7 
(testimony of G. Kevin Jones); TR. at 1263 lines 24-25, at 1264 
lines 1-12, 19-21 (testimony of Dr. Becker). 
Accordingly, the limitation period established by Utah Code 
Annotated 78-14-4 began to run with respect to JONES' claims 
against Dr. Becker and the University Hospital in January, 1987, or 
at the earliest late December, 1986. While the CT scan was 
performed on December 5, 1987, it was sometime thereafter that Dr. 
Becker notified JONES of the results. TR. at 1432 lines 1-12, at 
1444 lines 21-23 (testimony of G. Kevin Jones). Therefore, JONES 
had until January, 1989, or at the earliest, late December, 1988, 
to file his Complaint. Since JONES filed his Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action on December 4, 1987, he has filed within the 
statutory period and this action is timely pursuant to Peteler. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1; See Callahan, 365 S.E.2d at 719; 
Metzger, 709 P.2d at 417. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing has demonstrated that the District Court erred 
in its application of Utah Code Ann. S 78-14-4 to the facts of the 
present case. The Court made erroneous conclusions of fact, 
unsupported by any evidence in the record. Further the lower court 
improperly applied Foil to the case. 
Specifically, the court erred in finding that JONES was aware 
he had sustained an injury when the Doctors, and even the Court 
later found as a matter of fact no injury occurred. The Court 
further erred by failing to find factual or legal support for its 
holding that Plaintiff knew of the cause of his injury. Finally, 
the Court erred in completely omitting requisite findings regarding 
knowledge of potential negligence. 
Because the Court erred in its applications of the law in 
this case, reversal of the lower court's decision and a new trial 
is warranted. Affirmance of the District Court's decision would 
perpetrate an injustice because it would reward Defendants for 
delaying disclosure of the true nature of JONES' injuries until 
after the statute of limitations had run, leaving JONES without a 
legal remedy. 
Respectfully submitted this^?6Z<kday of August, 1992. 
'ROBERT F. ORTON - #A2483 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & 
GOTTFREDSON 
ATTORNEYS FOR JONES/ 
APPELLANT, G. KEVIN JONES 
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78-14-3 JUDICIAL CODE 34a 
professional liability insurance premiums can be rea-
sonably and accurately calculated, and to provide 
other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation 
and settlement of claims if* 
78-14-3. Definitions. 
AB used m this ad 
(1) "Audiologist" means a person licensed to 
practice audiology under Chapter 41, Title 68, 
Speech-language Pathology and Audiology Li-
censing Act 
(2) "Certified social worker" means a person 
licensed to practice as a certified social worker as 
provided in Section 58-35-5 
(3) "Chiropractic physician" means a person li-
censed to practice chiropractic under Sections 
58-12-50 through 58-12-56, the Chiropractic Im-
provements Act 
(4) "Commissioner" means the commissioner 
of insurance as provided in Section 31A-2-102 
(5) "Dental hygienist" means a person licensed 
to practice dental hygiene as defined in Section 
58-7-1 1 
(6) "Dentist" means a person licensed to prac-
tice dentistry as defined in Section 58-7-11 
(7) "Future damages" includes damages for fu-
ture medical treatment, care or custody, loss of 
future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future 
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor 
(8) "Health care" means any act or treatment 
performed or furnished, or which should have 
been performed or furnished, by any health care 
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during 
the patient's medical care, treatment, or confine-
ment 
(9) "Health care provider" includes any per-
son, partnership, association, corporation, or 
other facility or institution who causes to be ren-
dered or who renders health care or professional 
services as a hospital, physician, registered 
nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife, 
dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical 
laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical 
therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic 
physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic 
physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon, 
audiologist, speech-language pathologist, certi-
fied social worker, social service worker, social 
service aide, marriage and family counselor, 
practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering 
similar care and services relating to or arising 
out of the health needs of persons or groups of 
persons and officers, employees, or agents of any 
of the above acting in the course and scope of 
their employment 
(10) "Hospital" means a public or private insti-
tution licensed under the Hospital Licensing Act 
(11) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person 
licensed to practice as a licensed practical nurse 
as provided in Section 58-31-10 
(12) "Malpractice action against a health care 
provider" means any action against a health care 
provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of 
warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based 
upon alleged personal injuries relating to or ant-
ing out of health care rendered or which should 
have been rendered by the health care provider 
(13) "Marriage and family therapist" means a 
person licensed to practice as a marriage thera-
pist or family therapist as provided in Section 
58-39-6 
(14) "Naturopathic physician" means a person 
licensed to practice naturopathy as defined m 
Section 58-12-22 
(15) "Nurse-midwife" means a person licensed 
to practice nurse-midwifery as provided in Sec-
tion 58-44-7 
U6\ "Optom*tY\fct" wvfcatt* * pewo^ \\wra*/d to 
practice optometry under Chapter 16a, Title 58, 
Utah Optometry Practice Act 
(17) "Osteopathic physician" means a person 
licensed to practice osteopathy under Sections 
58-12-1 through 58-12-7, Utah Osteopathic Medi-
cine Licensing Act 
(18) "Patient" means a person who is under 
the care of a health care provider, under a con-
tract, express or implied 
(19) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to 
practice pharmacy as provided in Section 
58-17-2 
(20) "Physical therapist" means a person li-
censed to practice physical therapy under Part 1, 
Chapter 24a, Title 58, Physical Therapist Prac-
tice Act 
(21) "Physician" means a person licensed to 
practice medicine and surgery under Sections 
58-12-26 through 58-12-43, Utah Medical Prac-
tice Act 
(22) "Podiatrist" means a person licensed to 
practice podiatry under Chapter 5, Title 58, Podi-
atrists 
(23) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a per-
son licensed to practice as a physician in this 
state under Sections 5&-12-26 through 5&-12-4&, 
Utah Medical Practice Act 
(24) "Psychologist" means a person licensed to 
practice psychology as defined in Subsection 
58-25a-2(3) 
(25) "Registered nurse" means a person li-
censed to practice professional nursing as pro-
vided in Section 58-31-9 
(26) "Representative" means the spouse, par-
ent, guardian, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other 
legal agent of the patient 
(27) "Social service aide" means a person li-
censed to practice as a social service aide as pro-
vided in Section 58-35-5 
(28) "Social service worker" means a person 
licensed to practice as a social service worker as 
provided in Section 58-35-5 
(29) "Speech-language pathologist" means a 
person licensed to practice speech-language pa-
thology under Chapter 41, Title 58, Speech-lan-
guage Pathology and Audiology Licensing Act 
(30) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of 
duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission 
proximately causing injury or damage to an-
other ISfl 
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — 
Application. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is commenced 
within two years after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, whichever first oc-
curs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except 
that 
(a) In an action where the allegation against 
the health care provider is that a foreign object 
has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, 
the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
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within one year after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered, the existence of the for-
eign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, 
whichever first occurs, and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a pa-
tient has been prevented from discovering mis-
conduct on the part of a health care provider be-
cause that health care provider has affirmatively 
acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged miscon-
duct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable dili-
gence, should have discovered the fraudulent 
concealment, whichever first occurs 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all 
persons regardless of minority or other legal disabil-
ity under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of 
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, 
partnerships, associations and corporations and to all 
health care providers and to all malpractice actions 
sgainst health care providers based upon alleged per-
sonal injuries which occurred pnor to the effective 
date of this act, provided, however, that any action 
which under former law could have been commenced 
after the effective date of this act may be commenced 
only within the unelapaed portion of tune allowed 
under former law, but any action which under former 
law could have been commenced more than four years 
after the effective date of this act may be commenced 
only within four years after the effective date of this 
act isTt 
78-14-41.5. Amount of award reduced by 
amounts of collateral sources avail-
able to plaintiff — No reduction where 
subrogation right exists — Collateral 
sources defined — Procedure to pre-
serve subrogation rights — Evidence 
admissible — Exceptions. 
U) In all malpractice actions against health care 
providers as defined in Subsection 78-14-3(29) in 
which damages are awarded to compensate the plain-
tiff for losses sustained, the court shall reduce the 
amount of such award by the total of all amounts paid 
to the plaintiff from all collateral sources which are 
available to him, however, there shall be no reduction 
for collateral sources for which a subrogation right 
exists as provided in this section nor shall there be a 
reduction for anv collateral payment not included m 
the award of damages Upon a finding of liability and 
an swarding of damages by the trier of fact, the court 
•hail receive evidence concerning the total amounts 
of collateral sources which have been paid to or for 
the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available 
to him The court shall also take testimony of any 
amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited 
oy. or on behalf of the plaintiff or members of his 
immediate family to secure his right to any collateral 
*>urc<» benefit which he is receiving as a result of his 
*njury and shall offset any reduction in the award by 
•vich amounts No evidence shall be received and no 
eduction made with respect to future collateral 
•ouroe benefits except as specified in Subsection (4> 
<2> For purposes of this section "collateral source'' 
****)M payments made to or for the benefit of the 
Plaintiff for 
(a) medical expenses and disability payments 
payable under the United States Social Security 
Act, any federal, state, or local income disability 
act, or any other public program, except the fed-
eral programs which are reauired by law to seek 
subrogation, 
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability 
insurance, automobile accident insurance that 
provides health benefits or income disability cov-
erage, and any other similar insurance benefits, 
except life insurance benefits available to the 
plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or 
provided by others, 
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, 
group, organization, partnership or corporation 
to provide pay for, or reimburse the costs of hos-
pital, medical, dental, or other health care ser-
vices, except benefits received as gifts, contribu-
tions, or assistance made gratuitously, and 
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continu-
ation plan provided by employers or any other 
system intended to provide wages during a penod 
of disability 
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts 
paid or received prior to settlement or judgment, a 
provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30 
days before settlement or trial of the action a written 
notice upon each health care provider against whom 
the malpractice action has been asserted The written 
notice shall state the name and address of the pro-
vider of collateral sources, the amount of collateral 
sources paid, the names and addresses of all persons 
who received payment, and the items and purposes 
for which payment has been made 
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs 
that provide payments or benefits available in the 
future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the ex-
tent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to 
pay Evidence of the likelihood or unlikelihood that 
such programs, payments, or benefits will be avail-
able in the future is also admissible The tner of fact 
may consider such evidence in determining the 
amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for future 
expenses 
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to 
recover the amounts of such benefits from a health 
care provider the plaintiff, or any other person or 
entity as reimbursement for collateral source pay-
ments made prior to settlement or judgment, includ-
ing any payments made under Chapter 19, Title 26, 
except to the extent that subrogation rights to 
amounts paid pnor to settlement or judgment are 
preserved as provided in this section All policies of 
insurance providing benefits affected by this section 
are construed in accordance with this section itas 
78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent — 
Proof required of patient — Defenses 
— Consent to health care. 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered 
by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that 
what the health care provider did was either ex-
pressly or impliedly authorized to be done For a pa-
tient to recover damages from a health care provider 
in an action based upon the provider s failure to ob-
tain informed consent, the patient must prove the 
following 
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed 
between the patient and health care provider, 
and 
(b) the health care provider rendered health 
care to the patient, and 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries aris-
ing out of the health care rendered, and 
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(d) the health care rendered carried with it a 
substantial and significant risk of causing the 
patient serious harm, and 
(e) the patient was not informed of the sub-
stantial and significant risk, and 
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the pa-
tient's position would not have consented to the 
health care rendered after having been fully in-
formed as to all facts relevant to the decision to 
give consent In determining what a reasonable, 
prudent person in the patient s position would do 
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall 
use the viewpoint of the patient before health 
care was provided and before the occurrence of 
any personal injuries alleged to have arisen from 
said health care, and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care 
rendered was the proximate cause of personal in-
juries suffered by the patient 
(2) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action 
against a health care provider based upon alleged 
failure to obtain informed consent if 
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the pa-
tient actually suffered was relatively minor, or 
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from 
the health care provider was commonly known to 
the public, or 
(c) the patient stated, pnor to receiving the 
health care complained of, that he would accept 
the health care involved regardless of the risk, or 
that he did not want to be informed of the mat-
ters to which he would be entitled to be informed, 
or 
(d) the health care provider after considering 
all of the attendant facts and circumstances, used 
reasonable discretion as to the manner and ex-
tent to which risks were disclosed, if the health 
care provider reasonably believed that additional 
disclosures could be expected to have a substan-
tial and adverse effect on the patients condition, 
or 
<e) the patient or his representative executed a 
written consent which sets forth the nature and 
purpose of the intended health care and which 
contains a declaration that the patient accepts 
the risk of substantial and serious harm, if any, 
in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of 
health care and which acknowledges that health 
care providers involved have explained his condi-
tion and the proposed health care in a satisfac-
tory manner and that all questions asked about 
the health care and its attendant risks have been 
answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient 
or his representative, such written consent shall 
be a defense to an action against a health care 
provider based upon failure to obtain informed 
consent unless the patient proves that the person 
giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or 
shows by clear and convincing proof that the exe-
cution of the written consent was induced by the 
defendant's affirmative acts of fraudulent mis-
representation or fraudulent omission to state 
material facts 
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed 
to prevent any person eighteen years of age or over 
from refusing to consent to health care for his own 
person upon personal or religious grounds 
(4) The following persons are authorized and em-
powered to consent to any health care not prohibited 
by law 
(a) any parent whether an adult or a minor, 
for his minor child, 
(b) any married person, for a spouse, 
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco pa-
rentis, whether formally serving or not, for the 
minor under his care and any guardian for his 
ward, 
(d) any person eighteen years of age or over for 
his or her parent who is unable by reason of age, 
physical or mental condition, to provide such con-
sent, 
(e) any patient eighteen years of age or over, 
(0 any female regardless of age or marital sta-
tus, when given in connection with her preg-
nancy or childbirth 
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his 
minor brother or sister and 
(h) in the absence of <i parent, any grandpar-
ent for his minor grandchild 
(5) No person who in good faith consents or autho-
rizes health care treatment or procedures for another 
as provided by this act shall be subject to civil liabil-
ity 1976 
78-14-6. Writing required as basis for liability 
for breach of guarantee, warranty, 
contract or assurance of resu l t 
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care 
provider on the basis of an alleged breach of guaran-
tee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be 
obtained from any health care rendered unless the 
guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance is set 
forth in writing and signed by the health care pro-
vider or an authorized agent of the provider 197< 
78-14-7. A d d a m n u m c l a u s e prohibi ted in com-
plaint 
No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer of 
a complaint filed in a malpractice action against a 
health care provider The complaint shall merely 
pray for such damages as are reasonable in the prem-
ises 1976 
78-14*7.1. Limitation of award of nonecononuc 
damages in malpractice actions. 
In a malpractice action against a health care pro-
vider, an injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic 
losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconve-
nience In no case shall the amount of damages 
awarded for such noneconomic loss exceed $250,000 
This limitation does not affect awards of punitive 
damages isss 
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency 
fee in malpractice action. 
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care 
provider as defined in Section 78-14-3, an attorney 
shall not collect a contingent fee for representing a 
client seeking damages in connection with or ansing 
out of personal injury or wrongful death caused bv 
the negligence of another which exceeds 3313% of the 
amount recovered 
(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether 
the recovery is by settlement, arbitration, judgment 
or whether appeal is involved isss 
78-14-8. Not ice of intent to c o m m e n c e act ion. 
No malpractice action against a health care pro-
vider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff 
gives the prospective defendant or his executor or 
successor, at least ninety days pnor notice of intent 
to commence an action Such notice shall include a 
general statement of the nature of the claim the per-
sons involved, the date time and place of the occur-
rence, the circumstances thereof specific allegations 
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of misconduct on the part of the prospective defen-
dant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other 
damages sustained Notice may be in letter or affida-
vit form executed by the plaintiff or his attorney Ser-
vice shall be accomplished by persons authorized and 
m the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the service of the summons and com-
plaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, in which case notice shall be 
deemed to have been served on the date of mailing 
Such notice shall be served within the time allowed 
for commencing a malpractice action against a health 
care provider If the notice is served less than ninety 
days pnor to the expiration of the applicable time 
penod the time for commencing the malpractice ac-
tion against the health care provider shall be ex-
tended to 120 days from the date of service of notice 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its 
retroactivity, not be construed as relating to the limi-
tation on the time for commencing any action, and 
shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after 
Apnl 1, 1976 This section shall not apply to third 
party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a 
health care provider ins 
78-14*9. Professional liability insurance cover-
age for providers — Insurance com-
missioner may require joint underwrit-
ing authority. 
If the commissioner finds after a hearing that in 
anv part of this state any professional liability insur-
ance coverage for health care providers is not readily 
available in the voluntary market, and that the pub-
lic interest requires he may by regulation promul-
gate and implement plans to provide insurance cover-
age through all insurers issuing professional liability 
policies and individual and group accident and sick-
ness policies providing medical, surgical or hospital 
expense coverage on either a prepaid or an expense 
incurred basis, including personal injury protection 
and medical expense coverage issued incidental to li-
ability insurance policies ltw 
78-14-9.5. Periodic payment of future damage* 
in malpractice actions. 
11) As used in this section 
(a) ,fFuture damages'* means a judgment credi-
tor's damages for future medical treatment, care 
or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of boon y 
function or future pain and suffering 
(b) Tenodic payments" means the payment of 
money or delivery of other property to the judg-
ment creditor at such intervals as ordered by the 
court 
(2) In any malpractice action against a health care 
provider, as defined in Subsection 76-14-3(29), the 
court shall at the request of any party order that 
future damages which equal or exceed $100,000, less 
amounts payable for attorney's fees and other costs 
which are due at the time of judgment, shall be paid 
by periodic payments rather than by a lump sum pay-
ment 
(3) In rendering a judgment which orders the pay-
ment of future damages by periodic payments, the 
court shall order periodic payments to provide a fair 
correlation between the sustaining of losses and the 
payment of damages Lost future earnings shall be 
paid over the judgment creditors work life expec-
tancy The court shall also order, when appropriate, 
taat periodic payments increase at a fixed rate, equal 
to the rate of inflation which the finder of fact used to 
determine the amount of future damages, or as mea-
sured by the most recent Consumer Price Index appli-
cable to Uuh for all goods and services The present 
cash value of all periodic payments shall equal the 
fact finder's award of future damages, less any 
amount paid for attorney s fees and costs The present 
cash value of periodic payments shall be determined 
by discounting the total amount of periodic payments 
projected over the judgment creditor'6 life expectancy, 
by the rate of interest which the finder of fact used to 
reduce the amount of future damages to present 
value, or the rate of interest available at the time of 
trial on one year U S Government Treasury Bills 
Before periodic payments of future damages may be 
ordered, the court shall require a judgment debtor to 
post security which assures full payment of those 
damages Security for payment of a judgment of peri-
odic payments may be in one or more of the following 
forms 
(a) a bond executed by a qualified insurer, 
(b) an annuity contract executed by a qualified 
insurer, 
(c) evidence of applicable and collectable lia-
bility insurance with one or more qualified in-
surers, 
(d) an agreement by one or more qualified in-
surers to guarantee payment of the judgment, or 
(e) any other form of security approved by the 
court 
Security which complies with this section may also 
serve as a supersedeas bond, where one is required 
(4) A judgment which orders payment of future 
damages by periodic payments shall specify the recip-
ient or recipients of the payments, the dollar amount 
of the payments, the interval between payments, and 
the number of payments or the period of time over 
which payments shall be made Those payments may 
only be modified in the event of the death of the judg-
ment creditor 
(5) If the court finds that the judgment debtor, or 
the assignee of this obligation to make periodic pay-
ments, has failed to make periodic payments as or-
dered by the court, it shall, in addition to the required 
periodic payments, order the judgment debtor or his 
assignee to pay the judgment creditor all damages 
caused by the failure to make payments, including 
court costs and attorney's fees 
(6) The obligation to make periodic payments for 
all future damages, other than damages for loss of 
future earnings, shall cease upon the death of the 
judgment creditor Damages awarded for loss of fu-
ture earnings shall not be reduced or payments ter-
minated by reason of the death of the judgment credi-
tor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the judg-
ment creditor owed a duty of support, as provided by 
law, immediately pnor to his death In that case the 
court which rendered the original judgment mav, 
upon petition of any party in interest, modify the 
judgment to award and apportion the unpaid future 
damages in accordance with this section 
(7) If security is posted in accordance with Subsec-
tion (3), and approved by a final judgment entered 
under this section, the judgment shall be deemed to 
be satisfied, and the judgment debtor on whose behalf 
the security is posted shall be discharged isss 
78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Im-
munity Act 
The provisions of this act shall apply to malpractice 
actions against health care providers which are 
brought under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
in so far as they are applicable, provided, however, 
that this act shall in no way affect the requirements 
for filing notices of claims, times for commencing ac-
tions and limitations on amounts recoverable under 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. ltrs 
78-14-11. Act not retroactive — Exception. 
The provisions of this act, with the exception of the 
provisions relating to the limitation on the time for 
commencing an action, shall not apply to injuries, 
death or services rendered which occurred prior to the 
effective date of this act. 1S7S 
78-14-12. D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e to prov ide 
panel — Exemption — Procedures — 
Statute of limitations tolled — Compo-
sition of panel — Expenses — Depart-
ment authorized to set license fees. 
(1) (a) The Department of Commerce shall pro-
vide a hearing panel in alleged medical malprac-
tice cases against health care providers as de-
fined in Section 78-14-3 filed after July 1, 1985, 
except dentists. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures 
for prelitigation consideration of personal injury 
and wrongful death claims for damages arising 
out of the provision of or alleged failure to pro-
vide health care. 
(c) The proceedings are informal and nonbind-
ing, but are compulsory as a condition precedent 
to commencing litigation. Proceedings conducted 
under authority of this section are confidential, 
privileged, and immune from civil process. 
(2) The party initiating a medical malpractice ac-
tion shall file a request for prelitigation panel review 
with the Department of Commerce within 60 days 
after the filing of a statutory notice of intent to com-
mence action under Section 78-14-8. The request 
shall include a copy of the notice of intent to com-
mence action. The request shall be mailed to all 
health care providers named in the notice and re-
quest. 
(3) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel 
review under this section tolls the applicable statute 
of limitations until 60 days following the issuance of 
an opinion by the prelitigation panel. The opinion 
shall be sent to all parties by certified mail, return 
receipt requested. 
(4) The department provides for and appoints an 
appropriate panel or panels to accept and hear com-
plaints of negligence and damages, made by or on 
behalf of any patient who is an alleged victim of neg-
ligence. The panels are composed of: 
(a) one member appointed from a list provided 
by the commissioners of the Utah State Bar, who 
is a resident lawyer currently licensed to practice 
law in this state and who shall serve as chairman 
of the panel; 
(b) one member who is licensed under Section 
78-14-3, who is practicing in the same specialty 
as the proposed defendant, appointed from a list 
provided by the professional association repre-
senting the same area of practice as the health 
care provider; or in claims against only hospitals 
or their employees, one member who is an indi-
vidual currently serving in hospital administra-
tion and appointed from a list submitted by the 
Utah Hospital Association; and 
(c) a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, 
hospital employee, or other health care provider, 
and who is a responsible citizen of the state, se-
lected and appointed by a unanimous decision of 
the members comprising the panel. 
(5) Each person selected as a panel member shall 
certify, under oath, that he has no bias or conflict of 
interest with respect to any matter under consider-
ation. 
(6) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels 
shall receive per diem compensation and travel ex-
penses for attending panel hearings as established by 
rules of the Department of Commerce. 
(7) (a) In addition to the actual cost of adminis-
tering the licensure of health care providers, the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Li-
censing of the Department of Commerce may set 
license fees of health care providers within the 
limits established by law equal to their propor-
tionate costs of administering prelitigation 
panels. 
(b) The claimant shall bear none of the costs of 
administering the prelitigation panel except un-
der Section 78-14-16. lsss 
78-14-13. Proceedings — Authority of panel — 
Rights of parties to proceedings. 
(1) No record of the proceedings IB required and all 
evidence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the 
parties or witnesses who provided the evidence, docu-
ments, and exhibits at the end of the proceedings. The 
hearing panel has the authority to issue subpoenas 
and to administer oaths, and any expenses incurred 
by the panel in this regard are pi id by the requesting 
party, including, but not limited to, witness fees and 
mileage. The proceedings are informal and formal 
rules of evidence are not applicable. There is no dis-
covery or perpetuation of testimony in the proceed-
ings, except upon special order of the panel, and for 
good cause shown demonstrating extraordinary cir-
cumstances. 
(2) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with 
counsel, and participate in the proceedings, except 
upon special order of the panel and unanimous agree-
ment of the parties. The proceedings are confidential 
and closed to the public. No party shall have the right 
to cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary 
formalities of civil trials and court proceedings be fol-
lowed. The panel may, however, request special or 
supplemental participation of some or all parties in 
particular respects. Communications between the 
panel and the parties, except the testimony of the 
parties on the merits of the dispute, are disclosed to 
all other parties. 
(3) The Department of Commerce shall appoint a 
panel to consider the claim and set the matter for 
panel review as soon as practicable after receipt of a 
request. 
(4) Parties may be represented by counsel in pro-
ceedings before a panel. ltst 
78-14-14. Decision and recommendations of 
panel — No judicial or other review. 
The panel shall render its opinion in writing not 
later than 30 days after the end of the proceedings. 
The panel shall determine on the basis of the evi-
dence whether each claim against each health care 
provider has merit or has no merit and, if meritori-
ous, whether the conduct complained of resulted in 
harm to the claimant. 
There iu no judicial or other review or appeal of the 
panel's decision or recommendations. isss 
78-14-16. Evidence of proceedings not admissi-
ble in subsequent action — Panelist 
may not be compelled to testify — Im-
munity of panelist from civil liability. 
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The above-entitled matter came before the Court for a 
bifurcated trial commencing on November 12, 1991 on the issue 
of whether the statute of limitations had run as to the 
plaintiff's cause of action against the defendants. 
The Court having considered the testimony that was 
adduced, the evidence received, arguments of counsel and the 
applicable law has reached this decision. 
The Court finds from the evidence presented that the 
plaintiff, Kevin Jones, knew or should have known that he had 
sustained an injury and the causation of the same, on or about 
May of 1984. 
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Exhibit P-4, a letter dated May 29, 1984, from Dr. Becker 
to Dr. Middleton clearly indicates that Mr. Jones had discussed 
his sexual dysfunction with Dr. Becker prior to the date of the 
letter. Further, this letter indicates defendant had been 
"told by his family doctor that he might be impotent, secondary 
to his surgery." (line 24 of Exhibit 4). 
There is other evidence that supports the finding that 
plaintiff discovered "the injury11 and made the causal 
connection between the problem and the surgery in April or May 
of 1984. The Court finds there has been no showing of any 
fraudulent concealment of plaintiff's injury by defendants or 
anyone else. 
Therefore, plaintiff had two years from May of 1984, the 
point of discovery, in which to file an Intent to Commence 
Legal Action. 
The Court finds the evidence is uncontroverted that the 
plaintiff'.s Notice of Intent to Commence Action was not filed 
until December of 1987. 
It is clear from a reading of Deschamps v. Pulley. 784 P. 2d 
471 (Utah App. 1989), that a medical malpractice claim must be 
filed within the statute of limitations period and that the 
fact that a plaintiff's physicians do not render an expert 
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opinion supportive of malpractice and in fact may have 
discouraged suit, does not excuse the plaintiff's failure to 
file a timely claim. The Court in Deschamps v. Pulley, 
concludes that knowledge of a legal injury does not require an 
expert opinion confirming malpractice or the "statute would be 
tolled in every case until a plaintiff. . . found favorable 
expert medical testimony." (at p. 475). 
The Court finds that discovery occurs when a plaintiff 
knows or should have known he might have a cause of action. 
There is no legal authority for the proposition that 
"discovery" does not occur until a plaintiff is absolutely sure 
of the cause of his injury. For example, in the instant case 
there still appears to be a real fact question about the nature 
and existence of any sexual dysfunction and the cause. 
The Court finds the testimony of Dr. Becker concerning the 
plaintiff's condition to be credible. Dr. Becker stated, "Mr. 
Jones has'ill defined sexual dysfunction. . . the cause is hard 
to pinpoint. Objective evaluation has been equivocal in terms 
of clarifying what it is and if it exists." This evaluation 
appears to still be accurate, based upon the totality of 
testimony adduced. The Court finds Dr. Becker told plaintiff 
of the risk of surgery, including the risk of sexual 
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dysfunction, and that the plaintiff knew of this possibility 
before surgery; and that he related the sexual dysfunction he 
experienced to the surgical process, shortly after undergoing 
the second surgery. The Court finds plaintiff's articulated 
desire to have his sperm banked would not have been made but 
for knowledge of the risk of sexual dysfunction. 
The Court has considered plaintiff's demeanor and 
testimony, and finds that the plaintiff's demeanor, attitude 
and the content of his answers, reveals him to be an 
intelligent, careful man. Plaintiff's answers in court 
reflected a great attention to detail. The Court so finds and 
further notes plaintiff is a lawyer, who understands the 
concept of informed consent. The Court finds the plaintiff had 
access to the Mayo Clinic pamphlet and read the same. The 
Court finds that the plaintiff clearly testified that in 1984, 
he knew of changes in his sexual function or "system", i.e., no 
ejaculent and diminished erections (Ex. D-4). 
Plaintiff's specific testimony at trial was that he 
masturbated to "test" his sexual function after the first 
•surgery, and again after the second surgery, and that he 
noticed and reported sexual problems in April or May of 1984. 
Plaintiff testified that after the "testing", following his 
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first surgery, he felt relief and stated, "at least I got 
through that one okay11. The plaintiff's reference to "that 
one" was clearly a reference to surgery. Plaintiff also 
testified that he masturbated again after the second surgery 
and discovered what he perceived to be sexual dysfunction. The 
plaintiff and his parents, Veda and Garth Jones, testified that 
he disclosed the sexual dysfunction to them in May of 1984 and 
the surgery was discussed as a cause at that time. Garth Jones 
testified that he called Dr. Becker and asked questions 
regarding the "consequences of this operation" in relation to 
the sexual dysfunction. The evidence supports that in late 
April or May of 1984, the plaintiff told Dr. Becker he was 
experiencing no ejaculation. The testimony reflects that Dr. 
Becker discussed possible causes at that time and made 
referrals to Dr. Middleton and Dr. Hammond to further explore 
any sexual dysfunction. All of the physicians to whom 
plaintiff was referred, were advised of the dysfunction problem 
and plaintiff's concern about it being linked to the colon 
surgery. 
In Exhibit D-17, the deposition of Dr. Becker, Dr. Becker 
stated (at p. 98), that he told the plaintiff, referring to 
plaintiff's complaint of sexual dysfunction, "It is unlikely to 
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be the result of surgery." However, Dr. Becker goes on to say 
that surgery as a cause was discussed and "surgery was never 
ruled out11 as a possible cause of the plaintiff's problems. It 
appears that plaintiff was on notice at this time of the 
problem and the potential causes, including the surgery. 
The Court finds that while the plaintiff testified he 
didn't relate his sexual dysfunction to nerve injury from 
surgery until September, 1987, that is belied by the other 
evidence and by the totality of his own testimony. Further, 
the Court finds that the plaintiff's contention that he didn't 
think sexual dysfunction was a real risk, and wasn't advised of 
the same, is not credible in view of the totality of the 
testimony, including plaintiff's testimony that he considered 
and requested his sperm be banked. 
The Court finds that when the plaintiff got Dr. Dayton's 
opinion in September 1987, this only confirmed the plaintiff's 
own conclusion formed in 1984 as to the problem and its cause. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff found other theories on 
causation unacceptable. For example, plaintiff found Dr. 
Hammond's explanation, of a possible psychological cause for 
the dysfunction, incredible and "unsatisfactory" and never 
believed this to be the cause. The - plaintiff's actions, 
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including his failure to pursue psychological treatment, makes 
it clear that plaintiff never believed his problems were 
psychological. Exhibit D-ll establishes that in early 1985, 
Dr. Franklin L. Smith, a urologist, was asked by the plaintiff 
if surgery had caused his problem. 
The fact that Dr. Becker did not acknowledge in 1984 or now 
that plaintiff has a permanent sexual dysfunction problem 
caused by surgery, is immaterial to the issue of plaintiff's 
knowledge. Dr. Franklin L. Smith's testimony referred to 
plaintiff's request for information regarding the nexus between 
surgery and sexual dysfunction (See Exhibit P-14) and this 
Doctor indicated the plaintiff reported sexual problems 
starting "after the second operation in February of 1984". 
Finally, Terry Stoker's testimony supports the 1984 
discovery by plaintiff. 
Ms. Stoker testified that the plaintiff indicated he 
"contemplated suing" repeatedly. She clearly states threats of 
a lawsuit were made as early as 1985. 
The Court finds the continuing treatment doctrine is 
inconsistent with the statute of limitations passed by the Utah 
legislature. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders that counsel for 
the defendants, Mr. Williams, is to prepare more detailed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and an Order 
consistent with this Decision, and submit them as required 
under the Third District Court Rules of Practice. 
Dated this 18th dav of December, 19jrt:i 
v - W ^ /V. v^vftK 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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of the foregoing Court's Decision, to the following, 
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Robert F. Orton 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
68 S. Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
William T. Evans 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant State of Utah 
3 6 S. State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David G. Williams 
Attorney for Defendants University of 
Utah, University Hospital and 
James M. Becker, M.D. 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
G. KEVIN JONES, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH; THE Civil No. C88-2736 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH; THE 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
AND MEDICAL CENTER; and JAMES 
M. BECKER, M.D., 
Defendants. 
This matter was tried to the Court, without a jury, on 
November 12, 13 and 25, 1991. In accordance with $ 78-12-47, UCA 
(1953 as amended) the trial was limited to the issues pertaining 
to defendants' statute of limitations defense. Plaintiff was 
present at trial and represented by his counsel of record. 
Defendants were represented at trial by their counsel of record. 
Plaintiff and defendants adduced evidence through witnesses and 
exhibits and each rested. The Court having heard closing arguments 
from counsel for plaintiff and defendants and having reviewed the 
trial briefs submitted by plaintiff and defendants hereby enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In 1981 plaintiff was diagnosed as having chronic 
ulcerative colitis. He was treated for that condition with 
-A2ulfddliur—and- Prednisone by Dr. Clifford Harman, a 
gastroenterologist, through December 1983. 
2. In November 1982 plaintiff consulted with Dr. James 
Becker at the University of Utah School of Medicine concerning 
surgical options for treatment of his ulcerative colitis, including 
specifically the ileoanal anastomosis procedure. Between November 
1982 and December 1983 plaintiff's parents also visited with Dr. 
Becker regarding surgical options for treatment of plaintiff's 
disease. 
3. In October 1983 plaintiff visited the Mayo Clinic in 
Rochester, Minnesota where Dr. Huizenga, a gastroenterologist, 
confirmed the diagnosis of chronic ulcerative colitis and entered 
plaintiff into a study protocol for an investigational drug (5 AS A) 
for the treatment of ulcerative colitis. 
4. Plaintiff did not respond favorably to the 5ASA treatment 
and in December 1983 his ulcerative colitis became so severe that 
he was admitted to Holy Cross Hospital. In the opinion of his 
treating gastroenterologist, Dr. Harm an, medical therapies had been 
exhausted and surgery was necessary to save plaintiff's life. 
5. In January 1984 plaintiff and his parents discussed the 
surgical options with Dr. Becker. Plaintiff elected to undergo the 
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ileoanal anastomosis procedure after having been fully informed 
concerning the risks and benefits of that procedure and of the 
alternative procedures. 
6. Dr. Becker advised plaintiff that the risk of sexual 
dysfunction was lower with the ileoanal anastomosis procedure than 
with the alternative procedures, but that sexual dysfunction was 
a risk of the procedure. 
7. In January 1984 Dr. Becker explained to plaintiff that 
the ileoanal anastomosis procedure would be performed in three 
separate operations. 
8. On January 5, 1984, the first phase of the ileoanal 
anastomosis, removal of most of the colon and the creation of a 
temporary ileostomy, was performed by Dr. Becker on plaintiff. 
9. The first phase of the procedure was completed without 
complications. Following completion of the first phase and prior 
to the second phase of the procedure, plaintiff masturbated to test 
his sexual function. At that time he felt relieved and stated "at 
least I got through that one okay", referring to the first surgery. 
10. On February 27, 1984, plaintiff underwent the second 
phase of the ileoanal anastomosis procedure, the mucosal 
proctectomy or removal of the mucosal lining from the rectum. 
Again, prior to this procedure the risks were explained to 
plaintiff by Dr. Becker, including the risk of sexual dysfunction. 
11. In April or May 1984 plaintiff discovered what he 
perceived to be sexual dysfunction, including lack of ejaculation 
and diminished frequency and quality of erections. 
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12. In May 1984 plaintiff reported his perceived sexual 
dysfunction to his parents and to Dr. Becker. At that time he 
reported to Dr. Becker that he had been told by his family doctor 
that he might be impotent, secondary to his surgery. 
13. In May 1984 Dr. Becker referred plaintiff to Dr. 
Middleton, a urologist, and to Dr. Hammond, a psychologist and sex 
therapist, to explore the reported sexual dysfunction. 
14. Since May 1984, in discussions and correspondence with 
various physicians, plaintiff has repeatedly causally related his 
perceived sexual dysfunction to the second operative procedure 
performed in February 1984. 
15. Since April or May 1984, plaintiff has had an ill defined 
sexual dysfunction, the cause of which has not been definitively 
determined, phjertlvg^evaluatioag-fcavm been-eiMlvnral tEMrmrfl of ~~ 
rTnr1fTlng_fhe prrrrtrri ^YHfimction.^ 
16. Beginning in May 1984 and continuing thereafter, 
plaintiff knew and reasonably should have known that the second 
surgery performed in February 1984 was a possible cause of his 
perceived sexual dysfunction and that he might have a cause of 
action against defendants. 
17. Plaintiff did not accept or rely upon any other theories 
of causation suggested by defendants or any other physicians. 
Specifically, plaintiff rejected and did not rely upon any 
suggestion that there may be a psychological cause of his perceived 
sexual dysfunction. 
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18. Plaintiff was never misled or deceived in any manner 
concerning the possible causes of his perceived sexual dysfunction. 
19. Defendants did not fraudulently represent or conceal any 
information relevant to plaintiff's treatment, recovery or 
perceived sexual dysfunction. ^ 
j?\ J' 
2G-—BE4—Mereil—BaytOT—-did—not—provide plaintiff—any 
sLnfarmatioa—in—September—±9*7—concerning- possible causes of 
^plaiafci£f^--pereeived^ex of which plaintiff was not 
—previously-aware-
2$. During the years 1984 and 1985 plaintiff considered suing 
defendants for medical malpractice based on his perceived sexual 
dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the outcome of his 
surgeries. 
2i. On June 28, 1984 the third and final phase of the 
ileoanal anastomosis procedure was performed and completed. 
2$. All surgeries and treatment performed and rendered by 
defendants were provided at the University of Utah Medical Center. 
24. Dr. Becker was at all times relevant hereto a full time 
employee and faculty member in the Department of Surgery at the 
University of Utah School of Medicine. 
2fir. Plaintiff's Notice of Intent to Commence Action was not 
served until December 4, 1987. 
26. This action was commenced April 26, 1988. 
Zjn Plaintiff's action was not commenced within two years 
after he knew and reasonably should have known of his perceived 
sexual dysfunction and general dissatisfaction with the outcome of 
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his surgeries and that he might have a claim for malpractice 
against defendants. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The applicable statute of limitations in this case is S 
78-14-4, UCA (1953 as amended). 
2. Plaintiff's action was not commenced within the time 
required by S 78-14-4 and his action is therefore barred. 
3. The two year limitation period provided in S 78-14-4 
commences when the plaintiff discovers or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered that he or she has an 
injury and that he or she might have a cause of action based on the 
injury, commencement of the limitation period is not delayed until 
a plaintiff is advised by an "expert" that a valid claim exists or 
otherwise knows with certainty the cause of the injury or that the 
defendants were negligent. 
4. An action is commenced for purposes of the statute of 
limitations when the complaint is filed, but in this case the 
action was not timely whether the commencement of action is deemed 
to be December 4, 1987 when the Notice of intent was served, or 
April 26, 1988 when the Complaint was filed. 
5. in addition to the relevant findings of fact, the Court 
concludes as a matter of law, that defendants did not fraudulently 
conceal any alleged misconduct and that plaintiff was not prevented 
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from discovering any misconduct on the part of defendants by any 
fraudulent concealment. 
6. The "continuing treatment doctrine" is not applicable 
since the legislature passed § 78-14-4, UCA (1953 as amended). 
7 • The continuing treatment doctrine would not apply to this 
case, even in the absence of § 78-14-4, because of the Court's 
factual findings that plaintiff possessed all of the knowledge and 
information pertaining to his alleged injury and possible causes 
during the time he was being treated by defendants which he 
possessed at the time he commenced this action and he was not 
misled or prevented from obtaining any information as a result of 
the continuing treatment. 
8. Because plaintiff's action was not commenced within the 
time required by S 78-14-4, the applicable statute of limitations, 
it is not necessary for the Court to rule on defendants9 defense 
that the action was not commenced within the shorter period of time 
required by S 63-30-12, UCA (1953 as amended). 
DATED this ^ ^ xfay of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT; 
..eslie A. Lewis 
District Judge 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PATRICIA C. WHITE, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
defendants The University of Utah, The University of Utah Hospital 
and Medical Center and James M. Becker, M.D. herein; that she 
served the attached FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (Number 
C88-2736, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County) upon 
the parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof 
in an envelope addressed to: 
Robert F. Orton 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on 
t h e ^ day of January, 1992 . 
QfcZLft.iAL 
Patricia C. White j 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this o day of January, 
1992. 
he State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: NOTARY PUBLIC 
HARVI LYNN CHILES 
10 Exchange Place, ntft Ft. 
Sail Lake CJ«y. Utah fttm 
My Commusion Expiraa 
S*pMmoarS. 1W3 
STATE OF UTAH 
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